THE EFFECTS OF SOCIOECONOMIC INFLUENCES AND GENDER ROLE ON JOB-RELATED PERSONAL ENTITLEMENT AND REWARD ALLOCATION PATTERNS: A STUDY OF SEX ATTRIBUTES

By

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by

Irina Anastasia

This dissertation is dedicated to my family: to my mother Anastasia Leontievna Kondratieva, to the memory of my brother Georgy Timofeevich Kondratiev, to my sister Natalia Timofeevna Feodorova, and to my brother Ilya Timofeevich Kondratiev.

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This study was conducted to determine whether sex differences in work-related personal entitlement and reward allocation patterns disappear among subjects who are matched on prestigious high-status social background: university professors. In addition, the relationship among subjects' gender role, professional rank (assistant, associate, or full professor), years of postdoctoral professional experience (0-5 years, 6-10 years, or over 10 years), sense of personal entitlement, and reward allocation pattern was investigated.

It was also of interest whether androgyny emerges as a gender role specific to individuals of intellectually

prestigious socioeconomic background. In addition, participants in the study were invited to evaluate the fairness of the treatment they have received in their university and to speculate on possible reasons for unfair treatment. The latter was a qualitative component of the study.

An ex post facto survey was conducted, using the Interpersonal Disposition Inventory (IDI), an Equity/Equality scale, and a direct questioning measure. A total of 314 professors participated in the study. A stratified random selection procedure was used. A 2 x 3 x 3 x 4 ANOVA design was employed for statistical analysis of the effect of the four independent variables (sex, gender role, rank, and postdoctoral experience) on the dependent variables (job-related personal entitlement and reward allocation pattern).

The results of this study reveal no sex differences in job-related personal entitlement. No sex differences in gender roles or in preference for equality as a fairness-related principle were found either; however, women relied on equity significantly more than men in their choice of fairness-related principles. Support for Crosby's "paradox of the contented female" was gathered from the qualitative portion of the study.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Overview

Distinguished male anatomists used to argue that women were less intelligent because their brains weighed less, neglecting to correct for the strong influence of body weight on brain weight (Wade, 1994). Contemporary studies of sex differences venture on ground where stereotypes and prejudice render the results prone to misinterpretation. There has been too much concern with sexual difference, and too little with gender disadvantage (Rhode, 1990).

Goodrich, Rampage, Ellman, and Halstead (1988), as well as Walters, Carter, Papp, and Silverstein (1988), have demonstrated how mental health counseling can turn iatrogenic with respect to women when treatment bypasses the important sociopolitical realities of their lives. The pathologizing of women is particularly evident in cases of battered women, incest, and rape, for which psychological theories have long been used to imply that the woman either wanted or consented to the crime against her (James & MacKinnon, 1990; Ussher, 1991). The implied difference in

psychological makeup between the sexes inherent in the above theorizing rests on the absence of proper consideration of the socioeconomic realities of the sexes. Similarly, the findings of sex differences in research on sex and gender attributes may in fact reflect a social power differential between subjects. To avoid misinterpretations in studies concerned with sex differences, researchers have an obligation to account for subjects' social background/class stratification factors by introducing careful matching procedures in their investigations (Stoppard, 1988).

The failure of researchers to take into account such "extraneous variables" as the disadvantaged status of women--consistently documented by socioeconomic indicators--can lead to serious miscalculations of actual differences between men and women. By taking difference as a given, traditional approaches deflect attention from broader issues surrounding their social construction and consequences (Rhode, 1990). This situation necessitates a critical inquiry into the existing research findings of sex differences in such domains as distributive justice behavior, since the observed differences have been used to justify sex status inequalities (Nieva & Gutek, 1981).

Researchers interested in social justice have frequently examined what people consider themselves entitled to in work-related distribution of rewards between themselves and coworkers (e.g., Leventhal, 1976), what their

allocation strategy is in third party allocator situations (e.g., Jackson, Messe & Hunter, 1985), and what their allocation strategy is between themselves and coworkers (Major, 1987). The evidence seems to indicate that men and women differ in their sense of job-related personal entitlement and their pattern of reward allocation.

When given an opportunity to distribute rewards, whether between themselves and their coworkers or as a third party allocator, males and females have often been found to allocate rewards differently (Major & Deaux, 1982). In general, women usually take less of the available reward for themselves than men do; also, women allocate more equally, while men allocate more equitably (Boldizar, Perry & Perry, 1988). These sex differences have been observed in preadolescent children (e.g., Barnett, Andrews & Howard, 1978a; Barnett, Howard & Andrews, 1978b; Berndt, 1981) as well as in adults (e.g., Kahn, Nelson & Gaeddert, 1980a; Major & Adams, 1983, 1984; Reis & Jackson, 1981; Stake, 1985; Watts, Messe & Vallacher, 1982).

The observed sex differences have been linked to the nature of the comparative referent (Major, McFarlin & Gagnon, 1984), to the different values held by the sexes (Sampson, 1975), to the gender specification of the task (Reis & Jackson, 1981), to the nature of the reward: zero sum or independent (Major & Adams, 1984), to the gender-role orientation of the allocator (Olejnik, Tompkins & Heinbuck,

1982; Watts et al., 1982), and to the salience of the coworkers' role (Carles & Carver, 1979). Within these parameters, the underlying differences between the sexes have most frequently been explored in terms of the equity-equality theory (Boldizar et al., 1988).

According to this theory, males allocate rewards in agreement with the norm of equity more than females, and females allocate rewards according to the norm of equality more than males (e.g., Kahn et al., 1980b; Leventhal, 1976; Olejnik et al., 1982; Reis & Jackson, 1981; Sampson, 1975). The range of explanations put forth to account for the observed sex differences in allocations covers situational, interpersonal, and intrapersonal factors (see Kahn, O'Leary, Krulewitz & Lamm, 1980b; Major & Adams, 1983, 1984; Major & Deaux, 1982; Major, McFarlin & Gagnon, 1984). If gender differences reflect class hierarchy (Rhode, 1990), with males occupying the upper echelons, then common sense suggests that equal reward distribution should be favored by underclasses that have much to gain from it and avoided by the privileged classes that have something to lose. Equal distribution would in effect force the upper classes down and uplift the lower classes.

The "sex differences" mode of reasoning in research on work-related reward distribution behavior has led some authors to conclude that the difference in allocation pattern they observe is attributable to differences in

males' and females' values or personality characteristics (i.e., intrapersonal factors), which are due either to biological predisposition or socialization (see Major, 1988, for a complete review). "There is a fair-sized industry of a priori speculation on the biological causes of human gender differentiation, an industry that is not only intellectually disreputable, but potentially even politically pernicious" (Dupre, 1993, p. 12). The argument that men and women differ in their values and reward preferences has been used, as Nieva and Gutek (1981) point out, to justify the low rewards that women receive from their jobs relative to men. Furthermore, comparisons of the social behavior of women and men rarely show the consistent cross-situational sex differences that this type of explanation (i.e., value-based) implies (Deaux & Major, 1986). "[S]ocial class is an important determinant of one's sense of entitlement . . . . [I]ndividuals with a higher general sense of entitlement require more of whatever is at stake in an exchange, in order to achieve a state that they regard as compensatorily just, than those with a lower sense of entitlement" (Harrison, 1994, p. 447). Harrison (1994) recognizes sex as one of the determinant and devaluing variables in one's placement within the social hierarchy, according to which women in general as a lower class would show a lower sense of personal entitlement. Ostensibly, the disadvantaged position of women in our society could also

explain the experimental findings of sex differences in reward allocation strategies. Common sense suggests that a disadvantaged group would favor equal over equitable distribution of rewards and that members of a dominant class would prefer the self-serving equitable distribution, since their "outcomes" (see p. 10) would legitimately be greater to match their higher "inputs" favorably biased by their privileged position in society. However, a more inclusive explanation for observed sex differences would account for "the belief in a just world" (Lerner, 1971), the derogation of the victim, and our sociohistorical bias (Sampson, 1975) that leads us to believe that task considerations cannot reasonably be solved by equality solutions to the distributive problem.

> [S]ocial class and the resulting sense of entitlement have an impact on the terms of private orderings. Because individuals from higher social classes have a greater sense of entitlement, the terms of exchanges between different classes typically will favor those individuals. More generally, this means that the private orderings of people who belong to a class-oriented society will passively, though relentlessly, reinforce the existing class structure. (Harrison, 1994, p. 447)

It is unknown whether sex differences in work-related reward distribution hold for subjects matched on high academic and professional status (e.g., university professors), since most studies of relevance to the present research have used undergraduate students or children as subjects, the exception being Crosby's (1982) study.

Research dealing with sex differences in personal entitlement (deservedness) and/or allocation patterns conducted with undergraduates as subjects includes Major & Adams (1983), Major & Konar (1984), Major, McFarlin & Gagnon (1984), Kahn, Nelson & Gaeddert (1980), McFarlin, Major, Frone & Konar (1984), Reis & Jackson (1981), Summers, Sightler & Stahl (1992), Stake (1985), Jackson, Messe & Hunter (1985), Boldizar, Perry & Perry (1988), and Major, Bylsma & Cozzarelli (1989).

As D.P. Schultz put it: "In reading our journals, one receives the distinct impression that the only kind of people of interest to psychologists are college students!" (Schultz, 1969, in Huck et al., 1992). Within the academic social status hierarchy, students occupy the lower level and professors occupy the upper level of this structure. Social classes are "the blended product of shared and analogous occupational orientations, educational backgrounds, economic wherewithal, and like experiences" (Hodges, 1984, p. 13). The ensuing question is whether differences in work-related personal entitlement and reward allocation patterns (equal vs. equitable) hold true for subjects in intellectually high-status professional fields (e.g., university professors). In other words, would there be any difference between men and women on the above-mentioned characteristic if the subjects were matched so that women equal men in the highly advantageous social backgrounds which traditionally

have been reserved primarily for males? If the difference were to disappear, then the only plausible explanation for its being there in the first place would be the disadvantaged status of women in general (see review of Indicators of Sexual Inequality, below).

Feminist analyses of depression, for example (e.g., Stoppard, 1988), identify inequalities in the status of women as a crucial starting point in accounting for higher rates of depression in women. Repetti and Crosby (1984) found that sex differences in depression were eliminated when background social factors were taken into account. Although there is a long tradition of research employing the sex-differences model (Rosener, 1990; Rhode, 1990), dissatisfaction with its limitations has been growing (Caplan et al., 1985; Caplan, MacPherson & Tobin, 1985). Deaux's (1976) analysis of sex and gender research concluded that "sex differences" rarely turn out to be durable, replicable main effects. Deaux's (1976) analysis is in agreement with the major premise of this study, which rests on the belief that sex differences will disappear or turn into individual differences when individuals are matched on advantageous social background. Stated differently: academic and economic equality of the sexes will bring about a sufficient influx of conditions necessary for expunging the social disadvantage experienced by women and evidenced in the research.

A related question of importance to this research is whether a woman's gender role is one of these sufficient conditions, since according to Bem the origin of female social disadvantage is traced to cultural gender polarization, with its adherence to traditional sex roles and sex stereotyping (Bem, 1993; Kourany, Sterba & Tong, 1993). The conception of the sexes as embodying opposite traits (e.g., instrumental/expressive), which are assigned different values in our androcentric culture (Bem, 1993), is at the heart of equity theory's explanation of how the existing inequality of the sexes is maintained and finds its way into the "sex differences" manifested in research.

Theoretical Foundations

> Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions. First, they must be attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity; and second, they must be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society. (Rawls, 1993, p. 291)

Equity theory presents a uniquely dispassionate and compelling explanation of the heated debate over how the existing inequality of the sexes is maintained and translated into research findings of "sex differences." Built on the concept of distributive justice, it is concerned with the distribution of the conditions and goods that affect individual well-being (Homans, 1974). Equity theory is not so much a psychological law of human nature as

the psychological outcome of a culture's economic socialization practices (Sampson, 1975).

Equity theory captures a profoundly important generalization about social life: Humans in society always acquiesce in some form of inequality, always find it fair that rewards (or benefits or goods) should be unequally distributed among individuals (Brown, 1986).

The basic concepts of equity theory--reward, cost, profit, and investment--are borrowed from economics. Their meaning, though, is greatly extended. A person's investments are not only financial; they are anything at all that is believed to entitle her to her rewards, profits, or costs. An investment is any factor to be weighed in determining fair profits or losses (Homans, 1974).

Anything is an investment if people think it is, just as anything is a reward if people think it is. In other words, what counts as an investment is not an objective matter but is, rather, subjective; it is the perception or belief of one or more persons (Hatfield, Walster & Berscheid, 1978).

Age, race, sex, and sexual orientation are human characteristics that generally have been counted as investments in the United States, though the opposed social forces are so great that this is often denied (Brown, 1986).

> The differences attributed to sex are lines inequality draws, not the basis for those lines. Social and political equality are lived-out social systems that are basically indifferent to abstract conceptual

> categories like sameness and difference. Differences are inequality's post hoc excuse, its conclusory artifact. They are its outcome presented as its origin, the damage that is pointed to as the justification for doing the damage after the damage has been done. . . . Distinctions of body or mind or behavior are pointed to as cause rather than effect without realizing that they are so deeply effect rather than cause that pointing to them at all is a kind of effect. Inequality comes first. "Difference" comes after.
>
> Deep antifeminism supports the persistent treatment of gender in scholarship, politics, and law as if it truly is a question of difference, when the gender difference is a construct of the difference gender makes. (MacKinnon, 1987, in Rhode, 1990, p. 213)

In its calculation of equity, conventional reality still ascribes lesser values to African-Americans than to Caucasians, female is valued less than male, and homosexual less than heterosexual (Brown, 1986).

> So long as differences of race, sex, age, etc. are accepted as unequal investments, rewards will be distributed unequally (rewards need not be financial; they may be access to political power, to higher education, to legal justice, etc.) and equity ratios can be equal:
>
> If any of the many characteristics of minorities counts as an investment of, say, .5, whereas the contrasting majority characteristic counts as 1.0, then individuals having the majority characteristic are legitimately entitled to twice the rewards of individuals having the minority characteristic. It is as simple as:
>
> $$\frac{\text{Rewards of 2}}{\text{Investments of 1}} = \frac{\text{Rewards of 1}}{\text{Investments of .5}}$$
>
> What makes such inequalities equitable? Thinking so. Nothing more, but nothing less. (Brown, 1986, p. 82)

The very descriptiveness of equity theory has attracted its criticisms:

> Most important to the issues of social equality and justice is a long, close, and hard look at the prevailing equity-theory model. While this model clearly does not cause our ills, it reflects a condition of living that by its very uncritical

> reflection it helps to justify and thereby perpetuate rather than challenge. We should invest as much of our effort in giving away alternatives to the status quo as we now seem to spend in describing and affirming its validity and naturalness. We should spend as much time in seeking those conditions that facilitate the socialization of communion and egalitarianism as we have in analyzing those that create agency and equity. (Sampson, 1975, p. 60)

"Modern political theories agree that a society must treat its members equally in some respects, but they disagree over the respects, and the priorities among them" (Nagel, 1991, p. 63). Such contemporary social movements as the drive for racial equality, female liberation, gay pride, and so on may all be interpreted as assertions that certain investments ought to be given more respect and priority or reassessed and raised in value (Brown, 1986). Brown appears to view equality as conceptually tied to equity.

Others, however, have different views on equality. Lerner (1975), Deutsch (1975), and Sampson (1975) assume that equality is essentially different from equity. Anderson (1976) and Walster and Walster (1975) see equality as a special instance of equity.

According to Sampson (1975), persons allocate rewards perfectly equitably when they use the same--small or large--differences in outcome for equal differences in input level. Equality is considered as the degree to which different levels of input lead to minor or no differences at all in outcome allocation (Sampson, 1975).

Deutsch (1975) and Sampson (1975) conclude that males

rely more on equity, females on equality. One of the explanations for observed sex patterns of reward allocations and evaluations is that these patterns reflect underlying differences in what men and women care about or value (Sampson, 1975; Deutsch, 1975; Leventhal, 1976). According to this view, relative to men, women place a high value on interpersonal outcomes such as pleasant relationships with coworkers, and less of a value on self-maximizing outcomes such as money (Deutsch, 1975), whereas men are more concerned with competitive aspects of a situation and with individual gain at any cost (Sampson, 1975).

Sampson (1975) and Deutsch (1975) have used this type of explanation to account for sex differences in reward allocations between the self and others. These authors have noted that women's values correspond to goals that tend to be fostered by equal allocations, whereas men's values correspond more closely to goals that tend to be fostered by equitable allocations. The few studies that have attempted to test the value-based explanation directly--by comparing the allocations of men and women matched for interpersonal values--have yielded mixed results (Major & Deaux, 1982; Swap & Rubin, 1983; Major & Adams, 1983; Watts et al., 1982).

Gender Polarization in Culture and in the Mental Health Profession

"What an abyss divides the sexes! Let us abandon the pretense of sexual sameness and admit the terrible duality of gender. . . . The double standard may be one of nature's organic laws" (Paglia, 1991, p. 27). The premise of fundamental and natural sex differences asserted by Paglia (1991) is neither historically nor culturally novel. Karen Horney spoke of girls' inability to see their genitals and boys' ability to see theirs as the source of "the greater subjectivity of women as compared with the greater objectivity of men" (Horney, 1924, p. 53). Sigmund Freud continued to emphasize his conclusions that women are morally and ethically deficient, as well as masochistic and more prone than men to neuroses, as a weapon against them five years after American women gained the right to vote. "We must not allow ourselves to be deflected from such conclusions," he wrote, "by the denials of Feminists who are anxious to force us to regard the two sexes as completely equal in position and worth" (in Sherif, 1979). The "traditional" stereotype of women as subjective/relational and males as objective/instrumental (Parsons, 1951), whether incorporated in the practice of testing and treatment approaches or in theory and research, suggests the existence of an essential difference between the sexes that goes beyond reproductive differences.

The reason that only differences between the genders

> are considered of research or theoretical significance is not hard to uncover. Many psychologists . . . have noted the remarkable tendency not to publish, to ignore, or even to distort findings of no differences.
>
> The entire literature on sex differences reflects certain assumptions of its founding father, Sir Francis Galton, who also is responsible for the research tradition comparing racial and national differences. (Sherif, 1979, pp. 128-29)

The androcentric nature of our culture (Bem, 1993), with its adherence to traditional sex roles and sex stereotyping, is at the core of female social disadvantage, which shows up as "sex differences" in research (see Chapter II, Theoretical Model). A 1988 replication by Bergen and Williams (1991) of a sex stereotype study conducted in 1972 found no changes across the sixteen years in the affective meaning (Favorability, Strength, and Activity) associated with the male and female stereotypes, providing evidence for the persistence of the popular belief in sex differences (beyond reproductive differences). At the same time, Shield's (1980) discourse entitled Nineteenth Century Evolutionary Theory and Male Scientific Bias reflects on the sciences' long history of identifying emotion with femaleness, which is an example of scientific inquiry being tinted by cultural stereotypes. Neglect biases and discrimination against women in psychology are documented by Lerner (1989), Bohan (1992), O'Connell and Russo (1990), Squire (1989), Bronstein and Quina (1988), Ortertag and McNamara (1991), Walker (1991), Moke and Bohan (1992), Brown (1991), and Burman (1990). In yet another review of how

scientific biases reflect popular biases, Unger (1979) demonstrated how psychologists have shared society's prejudice that attractiveness in women is more important by using only female stimuli and male subjects in their studies on the perception of physical attractiveness. As Wallston and O'Leary (1981) point out, "the unwitting bias is most evident from the number of single-sex studies where the sex of subjects and/or targets go unmentioned in the abstract" (p. 14).

The conception of masculinity and femininity as embodying opposite and mutually exclusive traits has also been embedded in certain well-established psychological tests (Bem, 1993). These include the Therman-Miles (1936) Masculinity-Femininity Personality Scale (M-F), the California Personality Inventory (Gough, 1964), and the MMPI (Hathaway & McKinley, 1943). The existence of these scales testifies to fifty years of psychological efforts to evaluate the constructs of masculinity and femininity, an unrelenting search for the presumed core of what defines masculinity and femininity (Morawski, 1987). According to Hare-Mustin and Marecek (1990), such dichotomies caricature human experience; for example, to maintain the illusion of male autonomy, the contribution of women's work at home and in the workplace must be overlooked. "The portrayal of women as relational also ignores the complexity of their experience. Rearing children involves achievement, and

nurturing others involves power over those in one's care. When gender is represented as dichotomized traits, the extent to which presumed opposites include aspects of each other is overlooked" (Hare-Mustin & Marecek, 1986, p. 26).

The representation of sex as a dichotomy or opposition has had a long history in human thought (Bem, 1993). Even the autonomy-relatedness dichotomy, otherwise expressed as collectivist-individualist schemas (Marcus & Kitayama, 1991; Sampson, 1989), was foreshadowed by earlier dichotomies such as agentic-communal (Bakan, 1966) and instrumental-expressive (Parsons & Bales, 1955). In their extensive review of sex and gender research and cultural practices, Wallston and O'Leary (1981) noted the polarizing parallels between competence/ incompetence and physical attractiveness/unattractiveness as they apply to sex:

> Our very language has many more words to describe female than male attractiveness (lovely, stunning, cute, pretty, beautiful, versus handsome, good-looking). The reverse may hold for descriptions of competence. For example, letters of reference describe women's hard work and reliability more than their brilliance and make fewer projections of future contributions.
>
> . . . Not only are men more likely than women to be perceived as competent but also they are less likely to be perceived as unattractive. What is competent is beautiful and it is a male. (p. 28)

The outcome of socially constructed sex polarization in our culture is the automatic ascription of greater value to behavior and attributes that are defined as "masculine" and lesser value to the "feminine" characteristics (Hare-Mustin

& Marecek, 1990). "Since the male sex is more highly valued, men's behavior is frequently valued more, even when compared to equally effective behavior performed by women" (Wallston & O'Leary, 1981, p. 19).

Translated into equity theory terms: sex stereotyping and traditional gender-role socialization maintain the oppressed state of women and the dominant position of men, which preserves the same equity ratio for such human characteristics as sex:

$$\text{(male)}\ \frac{\text{Rewards of 2}}{\text{Investments of 1}} = \frac{\text{Rewards of 1}}{\text{Investments of .5}}\ \text{(female)}$$

Turning to psychological androgyny as an alternative to the traditional gender-role typing recognizes the equality and interrelatedness of men and women (Cook, 1985). The concept of psychological androgyny provides the basis for reassessing and equalizing sex characteristics, turning them into the inputs of comparable worth, and requiring equal outcomes.

The Concept of Psychological Androgyny

Stereotypical notions about desirable behaviors and life-roles of men and women have been challenged by the emergence of the "androgynous personality" concept. Counselors interested in helping people overcome the negative effects of traditional sex-role socialization have widely accepted psychological androgyny as a new image of

what people can become, according to Cook, who also suggests that the rapid popularity of androgyny since the mid-1970s indicates that the concept has filled a significant void in research and counseling practice about sex roles (Cook, 1985).

As pioneering androgyny theorist Sandra Bem points out:

> Although all human beings everywhere are simultaneously and inextricably separate and autonomous selves, as well as fully interconnected and interdependent members of a human community, no concept in a gender-polarizing culture reflects this two-sided fact about the human condition. Take, for another example, the gender-polarizing dichotomy between male rationality and female emotionality. Although the human psyche is simultaneously and inextricably both rational and emotional, once again, no concept in a gender-polarizing culture reflects this fact. (Bem, 1993, p. 193)

In regard to the use of the androgyny concept in this study, it is hypothesized that women in a high-status, traditionally male academic field (university professors) may have transcended cultural gender norms through the incorporation of androgynous attitudes and behavior. The gender roles of the subjects in this study are assessed via the Interpersonal Disposition Inventory (IDI). The subjects' gender roles are evaluated in terms of their relationship to sex, professional rank (full, associate, or assistant professor), and years of postdoctoral professional experience.

It is unknown if the gender role of subjects matched on academically prestigious social background is related to

their allocation pattern. Furthermore, there are no studies testing the relationship between subjects' gender role and their sense of personal entitlement. The investigation of these conditions also necessitates a deeper look at the concept of androgyny as contrasted with traditional masculine and feminine roles.

Several studies that looked into the nature of the relationship between subjects' gender role and their work-related distributive justice behavior yielded equivocal results. Watts, Messe, and Vallacher (1982) and Olejnik, Tompkins, and Heinbuck (1982)--both using undergraduates as subjects--found gender-role orientation to be a significant factor in reward allocation behavior, with masculine gender-role individuals allocating rewards equitably, and feminine gender-role individuals allocating rewards equally. The findings of Olejnik et al. (1982) indicate that androgynous males and females allocated rewards approximately halfway between equity and equality. On the other hand, Major, McFarlin, and Gagnon (1984) and Jackson, Messe, and Hunter (1985) found that subjects' (i.e., undergraduate students) gender role had no effect on the pattern of their allocations.

Statement of Problem

Chusmir, Moore and Adams (1990) found that the publication of research on working women declined steadily

during the early to mid-1980's, despite the prediction that 81% of women aged 25 to 34 years will be in the labor market by 1995. Some of the research cited in this study may thus appear at first glance to be relatively dated. However, as Sandra Bem's compelling analysis of the position of women in the contemporary United States shows:

> Surprising as it may seem . . . recent economic studies have demonstrated that women as a group are as economically disadvantaged in U.S. society today as they were in 1960, with only the subgroup of young, white, unmarried, and well-educated women showing any substantial economic progress and with everyone else so segregated into the lowest-paid occupations and part-time work that overall, women as a group still earn a mere 65 percent or so of what men earn. (Bem, 1993, p. 178)

In light of these data it is not all that surprising that two-thirds of poor adults in America are female (Faludi, 1992).

Translated into the language of equity theory (Brown, 1986), the female disadvantage may be expressed formulaically as:

$$\frac{\text{Male rewards } 2}{\text{Male investments } 1} = \frac{\text{Female rewards } 1}{\text{Female investments } .5},$$

with sex counting as an investment that keeps presenting sex inequality as equitable.

When findings of sex differences in research do not take into account the reality of female disadvantage, they tend to be interpreted within a sex-polarization framework, which inadvertently perpetuates the tendency to count sex as a differential investment within equity theory ratios.

Within the same line of reasoning, the androcentric nature of our cultural discourse automatically devalues "female" differences, and the equity-ratio sex inequality stays equitable (see Chapter II, Theoretical Model). Furthermore, when female social disadvantage was not taken into account in research on personal entitlement and reward allocations, the findings have been interpreted to justify the low rewards women receive from their jobs relative to men (Nieva & Gutek, 1981).

How can a scientific community safeguard itself from promulgating any further sex polarization? The feminists have long answered this question with a call for researchers to account for the background social factors of their subjects (Stoppard, 1988).

Most research findings of sex differences in studies of distributive justice behavior and attitudes that show women having a lower sense of personal entitlement (and preferring equal over equitable allocations, in contrast to men) were done with undergraduate social science students. However, it is not known if these differences still hold when subjects are matched for prestigious-status social factors (e.g. university professors). If the difference were to disappear, then the only plausible explanation for its being there in the first place would be the disadvantaged status of women in general (see Chapter II, Research Model).

It is also of interest whether these subjects differ in

their gender roles, as assessed via the Interpersonal Disposition Inventory (IDI). Since androgynous individuals are thought to be capable of transcending gender-polarization pressures (Bem, 1993), the following question emerges: What is the relationship between subjects' gender role, sex, professional rank (full, associate, or assistant professor), years of postdoctoral professional experience, personal entitlement, and reward allocation pattern?

Need for the Study

As long as questions can be raised regarding the equality and well-being of women, mental health professionals have a social obligation to continue the objective study of such concerns (Chandler, 1991). If it were known whether sex differences in work-related personal entitlement and reward allocation patterns disappear when subjects are matched for prestigious-status social background, the implications for theory and research would be manifold. Such knowledge would encourage the critical appraisal of existing theories of sex differences (e.g., biological, hormonal, intrapsychic) and promote continued clarification and advancement of socioeconomic explanations of gender differences in behavior and attributes. It is necessary to identify the sources of existing sex differences if strategies are to be devised for advocating the development of mental health policies that better serve

the needs of women.

More broadly, conclusions from research showing that women in conditions comparable to high-status males do not differ from males in their responses--thus supporting socioeconomic explanations of sex differences--would also be consistent with efforts to achieve greater equality for women in such areas as education, childcare, and employment.

Overall, if the premises of the present study are confirmed, it would imply that mental health policy needs to be more consistent with the position that sex differences in behavior and attitudes are socioeconomic, rather than psychological, phenomena, which is in agreement with equity theory's explanation of sexual inequality translated into research findings of sex differences. The awareness of oppressive socioeconomic influences in women's lives can help therapists avoid the traditional pathologizing (Gambrill, 1990) in intrapsychic intervention with persons who, in the words of White and Epston (1990),

> are endeavoring to situate their lives in preferred stories and to embrace alternative knowledges, but who are finding it difficult to do so because of the dominant and disqualifying stories or knowledges that others have about them. . . . In these circumstances, it could be appropriate for the therapist to encourage the recounting and the full appreciation of the person's history of struggle, and to explore possibilities for establishing the conditions that might facilitate performance and circulation of their preferred stories and knowledges. (p. 76)

Of equal importance is the assessment of the gender role in successful individuals. If the subjects exhibit

statistically significant levels of androgyny, support would be gathered for Hare-Mustin's (1980) and Bem's (1993) position emphasizing the importance of restoring the balance between masculine and feminine expressions of individuals, particularly in light of the view that psychological problems can develop from adherence to traditional sex-role standards (Hare-Mustin, 1980).

If no significance were found for the subjects' level of androgyny, then further attention to the critical studies of the concept of androgyny (Gelpi, 1974)--with its continuous clarification and modification--would be necessary, as the concept is gaining increasing popularity among mental health professionals (Cook, 1985).

A finding of high levels of androgyny among subjects matched for prestigious social and intellectual background would lend support to the line of reasoning which emphasizes the importance of reassessing and equalizing sex characteristics in transcending cultural sex norms, thus turning them into inputs of comparable worth, and requiring equal outcomes in accord with equity theory.

Purpose

The purpose of this study is fourfold. First, it is to determine whether sex differences in work-related personal entitlement and reward allocation patterns disappear if subjects are matched on the status of intellectually

prestigious social background (see Chapter II, Research Model). Second, the relationships among subjects' sex, gender role, sense of personal entitlement, reward allocation pattern, professional rank (full, associate, or assistant professor), and years of postdoctoral professional experience (0-5 years, 6-10 years, or over 10 years) is investigated. Third, it is also of interest whether androgyny emerges as a gender role specific to individuals of an intellectually prestigious socioeconomic background. In addition, participants in the study evaluate the fairness of the treatment they have received in their university and speculate on reasons they may have been treated unfairly. The latter is a qualitative (fourth) portion of the study.

A questionnaire developed by Rasinski (1987) is used to measure levels of adherence to the fairness-related values of equity and equality, which are the two reward allocation patterns of interest. The Interpersonal Disposition Inventory (IDI) is utilized in the assessment of subjects' gender role. Subjects' personal entitlement/deservedness is measured by direct questioning (see Appendix C, Instrument).

Rationale

To determine whether there are sex differences in job-related personal entitlement and reward allocation patterns, as well as the relationship (if any) between subjects' gender role, sex, personal entitlement, reward allocation

pattern, professional category, and years of postdoctoral professional experience, an ex post facto survey study has been designed.

Subjects for the study were selected from a pool of 3,029 male and female professors, whose listing was obtained at the university's office of academic affairs. The assessment instruments was mailed to subjects. Return-addressed envelopes were provided with the surveys.

Research Hypotheses

The independent variables of major interest are subjects' gender role, sex, professional rank (full, associate, or assistant professor), and years of (postdoctoral) professional experience. There are two dependent variables: subjects' (1) sense of job-related personal entitlement, and (2) reward allocation pattern.

The following research hypotheses are addressed in this study.

Ho(1): There is no effect on preference for equity or equality as a reward allocation pattern by sex, after controlling for gender role, professional rank, and years of postdoctoral professional experience.

Ho(2): There is no effect on job-related personal entitlement by sex, after controlling for gender role, professional rank, and years of postdoctoral professional experience.

Definition of Terms

The following terms are borrowed from Rasinski (1987), Bem (1993), Deutsch (1975), Sampson (1975), Homans (1965), Adams (1973), and Major (1988). They are used and presented as such for the purpose of consistency in comparison of results.

The terms listed below are defined as follows.

Personal Entitlement / Deservedness is a key mediating construct in theories of equity. It is, according to equity theory, a person's sense of what he or she deserves or feels justified in getting for his or her input in social exchange.

In this research, personal entitlement is assessed via straightforward questions as to subjects' present salaries and the salaries they feel entitled to or deserving of. The difference (if any) between the two constitutes a personal entitlement score.

Equity is a problem that may arise whenever two or more parties engage in social exchange. In this framework, two components of any exchange are identified: (1) inputs to the exchange, or whatever an individual "puts into" the exchange; and (2) outcomes from the exchange, or what an individual receives in return. Thus, equity judgments require evaluations of both the inputs and the outcomes for all parties to the exchange.

Reward Allocation Patterns (fairness-related principles) involve equity or equality judgments as reward allocation preferences.

(1) Equitable distribution--divides resources (e.g., outcomes) according to the values attributed to different inputs.

(2) Equal distribution--divides resources (e.g., outcomes) equally, independent of the values attributed to different inputs.

In the present study a questionnaire developed by Rasinski (1987) is used to measure the level of adherence to the fairness-related values of equity and equality.

Androgyny means having characteristics of both sexes. The term androgyny is derived from the Greek roots andr = man and gynē = woman. Androgyny is sometimes confused with hermaphroditism, which implies a kind of mixed biological sex, but the term is more appropriately used to describe flexibility in gender role. Androgynous individuals are those who have moved beyond traditional gender roles and have integrated aspects of masculinity and femininity into their lifestyles in pursuit of an individual sense of well-being. Androgyny offers the possibility of expressing whatever behavior seems appropriate in a given situation, instead of limiting responses to those considered gender-appropriate.

Androgynous Person is one who is freed from the need to

conform to traditional definitions of desirable sex-type behavior.

Sex refers to our biological maleness or femaleness. Many reference sources reviewed for this study use the terms "sex" and "gender" interchangeably. However, each word has a specific meaning.

Gender is a concept that encompasses special psychosocial meanings added to biological maleness or femaleness. Thus, while our sex is linked to various physical attributes (chromosomes, penis, vulva, and so forth), our gender refers to the social concomitants of sex, our masculinity or femininity, or in other words our behavior that is typically attributed to males or females.

Gender identity refers to our own personal, subjective sense that "I am a male" or "I am a female."

Gender role (sometimes called sex role) refers to a collection of attitudes and behavior that are considered normal and appropriate in a specific culture for people of a particular sex. Gender roles establish sex-related behavioral expectations that people normally fulfill. Behavior thought to be socially appropriate for a male is called masculine; for a female, feminine. In this study, one's gender role is defined as a rating on the Personality Research Form ANDRO scale (Bersins, Welling & Welter, 1981).

Subjects in this study were professors at a university in Florida. Subject and participant are terms that are used

interchangeably in referring to these persons unless otherwise indicated.

Research Questions

(1) Is there a difference between males and females, matched for high-status social and intellectual background, in their sense of job-related personal entitlement and their reward allocation preferences?

(2) Is there a relationship between any two or more of each: subject's gender role, job-related personal entitlement, reward allocation preference, professional rank, and years of postdoctoral professional experience?

(3) Are university professors significantly more androgynous, as opposed to traditional or undifferentiated, in their gender roles?

(4) How do university professors perceive their treatment by the university, do they differ by sex in dissatisfaction with their treatment, and what reasons do they present for perceived unfairness in the way they are treated? This question is investigated in the qualitative portion of the study.

Limitations

(1) The generalizations from this study are limited to persons of similar geographic area, professional status, and time frame.

(2) The main limitation of the study is the lack of complete control over the reactive effects attributable to the data collection procedures. It is possible that subjects' awareness that they are participating in a research project will influence their responses to the measuring instruments. In addition, the use of self-report questionnaires may lead to socially desirable responses that would tend to bias the results.

(3) Lack of information on subjects' departmental affiliation, salary, access to grants, the sex ratio in their department, and the precise nature of their comparative referents makes for a less than complete matching procedure, but this was balanced by the need to maintain anonymity and to ensure an adequate return rate for the surveys.

Assumption

The subjects are affiliated with an equal opportunity, affirmative action employer.

Organization of the Research

This study is reported in five chapters. In Chapter II, the related literature is reviewed. The research methodology and data collection and analysis are described in Chapter III. The remainder of the study includes Chapter IV, where the results of the study are presented, and

Chapter V, which includes a summary of the study, discussion of results, conclusions drawn from the research, and recommendations.

CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

Sociological Perspectives on Equity Theory

All social systems evolve mechanisms for the distribution and allocation of rewards, resources, rights, duties, obligations, and liabilities or costs (Cook & Messick, 1983). Equity theorists are concerned with identifying the principles of distributive justice that evolve within a social system (Sampson, 1975).

These principles have been addressed by social scientists from two theoretical perspectives: equity theory (Adams, 1965; Walster, Walster & Berscheid, 1978) and relative deprivation theory (Crosby, 1976). These theories share several core assumptions about the nature of justice: (1) the subjectivity of one's evaluation of the fairness of one's treatment; (2) in order to feel unfairly treated, one must value the outcome that one did not receive; (3) the perception of justice involves a comparison process in which the outcomes of the comparer are compared to those of the comparative referent.

The two theories differ in how they view the precise nature of the comparative referent. According to relative deprivation theory (Crosby, 1976), this comparative referent

may be what one expects in the future or received in the past; or it may be another person or group. According to equity theory, justice is achieved when the ratio of the comparer's inputs to outcomes is equal to the input/outcome ratio of the comparison other (Adams, 1965).

Essentially, equity norms require allocating greater resources to those whose inputs are greater relative to others (Sampson, 1975). A person's inputs are anything at all that is believed to entitle him or her to rewards or resources. Such stable human characteristics as sex, race, and line of heritage have historically been counted as investments in the United States, with variable opportunities for higher education, access to political power, and legal justice often serving as differential rewards allocated on the basis of these investments (Brown, 1986). Within the equity theory framework, reassessing and equating the value of the sexes (an investment characteristic of particular interest in the present research) will lead to a just distribution of outcomes or resources between men and women, thus eliminating the female disadvantage. No sex- and gender-related research is free from serious miscalculations of actual differences between men and women, unless it accounts for the disadvantaged status of women, the existence of which in the distribution of rewards in the U.S. has been documented through numerous research findings.

Indicators of Sexual Inequality in the U.S.

Sugarman and Straus in their work Indicators of Gender Equality for American States and Regions (1988) present measures of status equality. Status equality was operationalized by the authors by expressing the status attainment scores for women as a percentage of the scores for men. Indicators of equality in the economic, political, and legal spheres of life were computed for each of the 50 states of the United States. Large state-to-state and regional differences were found for all three spheres: In respect to the overall Gender Equality Index, scores ranged from a low of 19 (i.e., 19% of what is needed for equality with men) to a high of only 60%. The scores ranged from 50 to 67 in respect to economic equality, from 4 to 24 in respect to political equality, and from zero to 92 in respect to legal equality.

> Thus, even in the state with the highest score on the Gender Equality Index [Oregon], women have achieved only 60% parity with men. The medians are also important because they showed that in a typical state, women have achieved only 54% of what is necessary for economic equality with men, only 12% of what is needed for political equality, and only 55% of the statutory protections which will enable further progress toward gender equality. Combining all three spheres, the median score of 42 on the overall Gender Equality Index shows that, in the typical American state, women have achieved less than half of what is needed for equal status with men. (Sugarman & Strauss, 1988, p. 264)

The process of socialization, with its emphasis on traditional sex roles, sex-typing of jobs, and leaving the majority of economic, political, and legal power in the

hands of white males, has a devaluing effect on women in our society. Creighton (1982), for example, shows how employers take advantage of the social and domestic skills acquired by women through gender role socialization, and hire women for jobs involving nurturing, cleaning, waiting on other people, and public relations work (Chafetz, 1990).

However, not everyone sees the roots of female social disadvantage in cultural androcentrism. For example, in an effort to account for the full impact of patriarchal acculturation in women's lives, Paglia's (1991) discourse goes like this:

> One of feminism's irritating reflexes is its fashionable disdain for "patriarchal society," to which nothing good is ever attributed. But it is patriarchal society that has freed me as a woman. It is capitalism that has given me the leisure to sit at this desk writing this book. Let us stop being small-minded about men and freely acknowledge what treasures their obsessiveness has poured into culture.
>
> . . . It is hypocritical for feminists and intellectuals to enjoy the pleasures and conveniences of capitalism while sneering at it. (pp. 37-38)

Notwithstanding Paglia's (1991) critique of the "feminist reflexes," research on sex differences in subjects' feelings of personal entitlement to monetary payment for work performed (Major, McFarlin & Gagnon, 1984; Summers & De Cotiis, 1988) still shows that women's internal standards of fair pay for their work are lower than men's. Among the explanations put forth to account for this phenomenon are social comparison referents hypotheses (Major et al., 1984), the equity theory Consistency Perspective

(Homans, 1961), and Lerner's (1970) belief in the "just world" hypothesis. The consistency perspective of equity theory places stress on the need to organize cognitions in a consistent way (Homans, 1961). As an example, the "just world" hypothesis of Lerner and Meindl (1981) suggests that people assume that one ultimately gets what one deserves; that is, outcomes are consistent with investments. This notion operates in both directions: if a person makes positive investments, she deserves positive outcomes; and if a person receives positive outcomes, one infers that she has made positive investments (Lerner & Meindl, 1981). An analogous relationship is assumed to hold for negative investments and negative outcomes. In other words, as a result of societal devaluation of their work some women may come to believe that they deserve less and subjectively consider their investments (skills, capacities, efforts) as less than objectively comparable investments of males (Lerner & Meindl, 1981).

Societal devaluation of women's work in the form of blocking appropriately trained women from entering "male" jobs (Leap & Crino, 1989; Major & Forsey, 1985) or blocking women from obtaining skills needed to qualify for these jobs (England & Dunn, 1988) as well as wage discrimination and occupational segregation (Resnick & Hartmann, 1986; Tompson, 1989; Scott & McClellan, 1990) have been well documented by a number of studies. Steinberg (1984) examined the levels

of compensation across female-dominated and male-dominated jobs (hereinafter "female jobs" and "male jobs") within particular workplaces, taking into account such job content characteristics as entry requirements of education and experience. Even when basing their comparisons on measures of job complexity that gave few points for such "female" job characteristics as working with difficult clients or communicating with the public, differences in pay often defied justification (Steinberg, 1984).

In the State of Washington, for example, the position of legal secretary was found to be equivalent in job complexity to that of a heavy equipment operator; yet the equipment operator was making almost $400 more per month (Resnick, 1980). Similarly, a stockroom attendant made $300 more than an equivalently evaluated dental hygienist (Resnick, 1980). Using a slightly different approach to measuring job complexity, the Minnesota Task Force on Pay Equity found that there was a $537 monthly differential between a registered nurse and a vocational education teacher (Steinberg, 1984).

An influential study examined the Dictionary of Occupational Titles and found that the positions of dog pound attendant, parking lot attendant, and zookeeper were rated as more complex jobs than nursery school teacher and childcare worker (Steinberg, 1984). The devaluation of "female jobs" and in particular of housework is apparent at

the societal level. Unpaid housework is not listed in the U.S. Department of Labor's Dictionary of Occupational Titles. Its monetary value is not computed in the gross national product--an example of androcentrism and an "official denial that this work is socially necessary" (Unger & Crawford, 1992). Steinberg (1984) found that the DOT had assessed nurse-midwife as a less complex job than hotel clerk and foster mothering as less complex than pushing horse-drawn carts. In 1985, the California School Employees Association found that school librarians and teaching assistants were paid considerably less than custodians and groundskeepers. In Philadelphia, the Employment Practical Task Force of the Mayor's Commission on Women reported that practical nurses received no more pay than automotive drivers and fell one pay grade below gardeners (Steinberg, 1990).

From a comparable worth perspective, these differences in pay constitute a measure of wage discrimination, since they reflect the systematic undervaluation of women's work because that work has been and continues to be done by women (Steinberg, 1990). Steinberg (1990) also points out that the "femaleness" of a job is, in effect, a characteristic that implicitly enters into the compensation structure (i.e., it is a "compensable" characteristic). "Femaleness" lowers the wage rate of a job, net of other job characteristics (Steinberg, 1990). In other words,

systematic societal undervaluation of wages paid to incumbents of historically female and male minority jobs means that those wages are lower than what they would be if those same jobs were performed by white males. Moreover, women high school graduates earn, on average, about $5,600 less each year than men who did not even finish high school, and women college graduates earn about $15,400 less annually than comparable men (Rix, 1990).

An interesting example of how women come to devalue their work under the influence of male self-serving beliefs is drawn from the job evaluation phase of a 1989 pay equity study in Oregon:

> Job evaluation committees of nonmanagerial employees were created to evaluate all nonmanagerial jobs. The committees contained both male and female employees from a diverse range of occupations. As part of the evaluation process, committee members routinely supplemented job specifications with their personal knowledge of the tasks and responsibilities associated with the various jobs. A sociologist observing this process was struck by the differential assessment of this information by committee members. She found that the men questioned the women's authority when they suggested that jobs being evaluated were more complex than the specifications suggested. This made it difficult to achieve a consensus on job worth. As a result, the points assigned to the female jobs in question were always lower than they would have been had the information been taken into account. By contrast, the women on the committees never questioned the authority of the men to add information to the job specifications. This information was taken into account in determining job complexity, resulting in higher point scores than if the specifications alone had been relied on. Thus, even when women are represented on evaluation committees, their ability to effectively press their claims as to the complexity of women's work is limited by male images of women's jobs. (Steinberg, 1990, pp. 467-468)

Consequently, full-time working women in the U.S. are concentrated in lower-paying, lower-prestige jobs than men, and women are paid less than similarly qualified men doing comparable work (Goldin, 1990; Bem, 1993; Charles, 1993). This difference holds even when men and women are matched on numerous job characteristics that typically covary with sex, such as age, education, organizational tenure, tenure in present position, and occupational prestige (Gwartney-Gibbs & Lach, 1994; England & McCreary, 1987). Furthermore, even though women recognize that other women obtain less than they deserve for their jobs, they feel that they personally receive what they deserve (Major, 1987). These findings are consistent with, but not fully explained by, research suggesting that women are less likely than men to engage in a variety of self-enhancing strategies (Major, 1987). For example, relative to men, women tend to evaluate their own performances more harshly in the absence of feedback (Lenny, 1977), expect to receive lower salaries than their male college classmates (Summers, 1988; Major & Konar, 1984), are less likely to take credit for their successes and more likely to accept responsibility for their failures, and tend to underestimate how well they will perform in the future (Deaux, 1984).

Whether asked to determine a fair exchange for others or to decide on a fair exchange for themselves alone, women appear to feel entitled to less than men who have done

comparable work (Major, 1987). The roots of these internal barriers to women's equality may be traced to the expectations that our androcentric society places on women (Steinem, 1993). In another interesting example, Hagen and Kahn (1975) found that men liked incompetent women best, when required to interact with them. However, they preferred competent female leaders to incompetent ones, and were willing to overlook their dislike of that competence, according to the authors. An alternative explanation for the "switch" that a competent female leader stirs in males may include some form of psychological gender-neutralizing that a woman in power would be subjected to by viewing males. Thus, an intriguing question raised by Papp gains its relevance: "Within the belief that power is an aphrodisiac, does this hold true for women as well as for men?" (Walters, Carter, Papp & Silverstein, 1988, p. 201).

Women in American society are generally expected to be less capable than men, particularly in situations involving some sort of task performance (Wagner, Ford & Ford, 1986). Identical assertive speech is evaluated differently, depending on whether the speaker is a woman or a man. Women who speak in an assertive, direct style are judged to be as competent as assertive men--but considerably less likeable (Crawford, 1988; Gervasio & Crawford, 1989).

> There are numerous studies showing that gender affects the way in which we view a person's competence and how we evaluate that person's behavior and achievements. Typically, two similar groups of people are asked to

> rate a collection of something such as a set of articles, or pictures of works of art, or resumes. The names of the authors or creators are switched for each group, so that those items ascribed to women for the first group are ascribed to men for the second group, and those items ascribed to men in the first group are ascribed to women in the second group. The results of these studies are remarkably consistent: When an item has a male name ascribed to it, it receives a higher rating than when the same article has a female name ascribed to it. Both women and men do this: they devalue those items ascribed to females. Similarly, success for men and women is viewed differently: men's success is typically attributed to talent; women's success is more likely to be attributed to luck, or affirmative action. The identical behavior is often viewed differently for men and women. For example, men are "forthright"; women are "abrasive." Men have "judgment"; women have "intuition," which is considered far less reliable than good "judgment." (Sandler, 1991)

Interestingly, both men and women have been found to develop such expectations (Major, 1984). Female students rated female attorneys as less intelligent, friendly, pleasant, capable, expert, and experienced than male attorneys, and all students preferred to hire a man should they need an attorney (Hodson & Pryor, 1984).

Such sex-stereotyped expectations have strong and widespread behavioral consequences. Male leaders are asked for information more often than female leaders; men interrupt women much more often than women interrupt men in mixed-sex groups; men participate more frequently in group interaction than women; in ambiguous task situations, women are more influenced than men; when a knowledgeable man and woman say the same thing, more attention is paid to the man (Wagner et al., 1986). Further, women and other out-groups

are viewed as more homogeneous than dominant groups (Park & Rothbart, 1982). Differences among men are readily identified, but all women are regarded as pretty much the same (Hare-Mustin, 1990). Thus, men are viewed as individuals, while women are viewed as women (Hare-Mustin, 1990). In short, differences in the task behavior of men and women generally reflect differences in expectations for men and women (Berger, Rosenholtz & Selditch, Jr., 1980). These expectations--which have also been demonstrated by Jacobson and Effertz's (1974) study attempting to locate the conditions under which the merit of achievement would promote eradication of stereotypical sex-attributions--have been referred to as the "talking platypus phenomenon" (Wallston & O'Leary, 1981), meaning basically "It matters little what the platypus says, the wonder is it can say anything at all" (Abramson, Goldberg, Greenberg & Abramson, 1977).

The Androgyny Debate

Traditionally, masculinity and femininity have been dichotomized as bipolar opposites and labeled as the appropriate domain of one sex alone (Constantinople, 1973). The concept of androgyny grows from a recent alternative view of masculinity and femininity representing them as complementary rather than antagonistic groups of psychological characteristics (Cook, 1985). According to

this view, "femininity and masculinity reside in everyone to some extent. Men and women differ from each other and among themselves in terms of the relative degree to which they possess and express each domain" (Cook, 1985, p. 567). This reconceptualization of masculinity and femininity implies new standards for mental health. Mental health professionals have previously thought that adoption of a traditional sex-role identity was essential for mental health (Constantinople, 1973). Now it is widely believed that each dimension has its own unique strengths for everyone, so that psychological problems can develop from strong adherence to traditional sex-role standards (cf. Brodsky & Hare-Mustin, 1980; O'Neil, 1988). Masculine women, feminine men, and people who possess low degrees of both sets of characteristics, however, can also miss some benefits derived from developing both complementary dimensions (Bem, 1993).

The most favorable alternative to traditional gender roles is believed to be androgyny, generally defined as the balanced blending of high levels of both masculine and feminine characteristics (Bem, 1993). The androgynous person, freed from the restrictive sex-appropriate standards for behavior, is theoretically able to (a) develop psychologically to the fullest, (b) respond adaptively to a wide range of situations, and (c) overcome or avoid psychological stresses that the less integrated traditional

sex-typed persons are not equipped to handle (see Cook, 1985, for a complete discussion of androgyny). The implications of the androgyny concept appeal to many counselors. Foxley (1979) discussed how the concept is consistent with broad humanistic goals of self-actualization, a healthy sense of self, and flexibility. Androgyny has been embraced as a growth-affirming outcome or goal for clients who are struggling with what it means to be a man or woman in today's world (Baker, 1980). Worell (1980) has called for counselors to adopt the orientation for themselves and to encourage their clients in their progress toward androgyny.

In spite of the popularity of the androgyny concept, it has been a subject of considerable controversy. According to Gelpi, androgyny has been used throughout the history of Western culture as a vision of how the "perfect man" (1974, p. 153) could be created, as a vision in other words of how a "masculine vessel" could be "filled and fulfilled by feminine emotion and physicality" (p. 152). In the "brave new world of male androgenes" (p. 157), men could thus be androgynous while women would still be androcentrically defined in relation to men. Some say this androcentric history and emphasis are even represented in the term itself, which places <u>andro</u> (male) before <u>gyne</u> (female) (Bem, 1993). Others see androgyny as dangerous to "male concentration":

> Androgyny, which some feminists promote as a pacifist blueprint for sexual utopia, belongs to the contemplative rather than active life. It is the ancient prerogative of priests, shamans, and artists. Feminists have politicized it as a weapon against the masculine principle. Redefined, it now means men must be like women and women can be whatever they like. Androgyny is a cancellation of male concentration and projection. Prescriptions for the future by bourgeois academics and writers carry their own bias. (Paglia, 1991, pp. 21-22)

Paglia's criticism of the psychological androgyny concept stems from her sex-dualistic philosophy, which is aimed at legitimizing polarization of the sexes. Her philosophy of irrevocable sex differences is stated as follows:

> Political equality for women, desirable and necessary as it is, is not going to remedy the radical disjunction between the sexes that begins and ends in the body. The sexes will always be jolted by violent shocks of attraction and repulsion. (Paglia, 1991, p. 21)

A different sort of psychological androgyny criticism comes from Sandra Bem (1993), who was among the first to popularize the concept. Bem readily recognizes the major limitation of androgyny's focus on the person rather than the patriarchy, thus providing no conceptual or political analysis of sexual inequality. At the same time, Bem underscores that

> [a]t a certain historical moment for feminist theorists, and even today for many people confused about how to behave as a man or a woman, androgyny provides both a vision of utopia and a model of mental health that does not require the individual to banish from the self whatever attributes and behaviors the culture may have stereotypically defined as inappropriate for his or her sex. (Bem, 1993, p. 124)

Sex and Equity

Do men and women differ in their sense of personal entitlement or in what they feel they deserve from their jobs or relationships, and do they differ in their pattern of reward distribution (e.g., equal or equitable)? These questions concern distributive justice--the conditions under which outcome distributions (e.g., rewards, goods, services) are perceived as fair. Social scientists have generally addressed questions of justice from one of two theoretical perspectives: equity theory (Adams, 1965) or relative deprivation theory (Crosby, 1976). According to equity theory, justice is achieved when the ratio of the comparer's inputs (contributions) to outcomes (rewards) is equal to the input/outcome ratios of others to whom comparison is made (Adams, 1965).

Studies on sex differences in distribution behavior indicate that, despite objectively similar performance inputs, women generally allocate fewer rewards to themselves than men do (see Crosby, 1982; Kahn, O'Leary, Kralewitz & Lamm, 1980; Major & Deaux, 1982, for reviews). Research also reveals frequent differences in allocation patterns: women tend to distribute rewards more equally, whereas men tend to allocate rewards in accord with merit or equity (Kahn, O'Leary, Kralewitz & Lamm, 1980; Major & Deaux, 1982; Sampson, 1975).

Although a number of possible explanations for these sex differences have been proposed, certainly the most popular and most enduring explanation is that differences in interpersonal values, styles, or goals are responsible (Major, 1987). Women are assumed to be more communal, more status-neutralizing, and more oriented toward maximizing the interpersonal aspects of their relationships with their partners (Sampson, 1975; Deutsch, 1975). Men, in contrast, are assumed to be more agentic, more status-assertive, and more concerned with performing tasks and maximizing material rewards (Deaux, 1976; Kahn et al., 1980). Proponents of value-based explanations for sex differences in allocation behavior have noted correspondences between the presumed interaction goals of females and the goals fostered by equal allocation, as compared to the presumed interaction goals of males and the goals fostered by equitable allocation (Deutsch, 1975; Sampson, 1975). Although the sexes are widely assumed to differ in their interaction goals or values, comparisons of the social behavior of women and men rarely show the consistent cross-situational gender differences that such an assumption implies (Deaux, 1984). The outcome-values explanation for sex differences in distributive behavior reflects the dominant view of psychologists with respect to sex, which is that due either to socialization or biological predisposition, adult women and men develop differing personality characteristics and

values (Major, 1987). Furthermore, this view tends to promote gender dichotomy and ignore the impact of structural factors, such as the unequal status and rewards received by men and women in society and the unequal distribution of men and women in communal (e.g., domestic) and agentic (e.g., work) roles (Major, 1987).

Three studies by Major and Adams (1983), Swap and Rubin (1983), and Watts, Vallacher, and Messe (1982) were designed to test the value-based explanation directly. In all three studies, sex differences were still observed when subjects were matched on some measure of interpersonal value (e.g., agency/communion); women still allocated rewards between themselves and others more equally and men allocated more equitably. Thus a serious challenge to the value-based explanation was established.

These types of findings are not restricted to situations in which women and men must choose between rewarding themselves or rewarding others. Callahan-Levy and Messe (1979, Experiment 1), for example, examined how subjects (undergraduate men and women) allocated rewards to themselves and to others when these decisions were independent, i.e., noncontingent. They found that women and men did not differ in the amount they paid to others, male or female. However, women paid themselves less money, and reported that less money was fair pay for their own work, as compared to men. This study suggests that women and men

differ primarily in how they reward themselves, not in how they reward others.

Two studies by Major, McFarlin & Gagnon (1984) also support the conclusion that sex differences in allocation reflect differences in women's and men's sense of their own entitlement. These researchers found that differences in self-reward occurred even though women felt their performance was just as good as the men thought theirs was. No sex differences in self-pay were observed in the presence of clear guidelines as to what others thought was appropriate self-pay (Major et al., 1984). Major et al. (1984) concluded that comparative referents used by women and men could account for their justice-related judgments. Varka, Schaffer and McCauley (1983), Summers and De Cotiis (1988), and Zauna, Crosby and Lowenstein (1987) came to the same conclusion in their studies of the extent to which gender is used as referent other. This argument explicitly recognizes the impact of the different social status of men and women on their attitudes and behavior:

> [E]ntitlement differences may occur as a consequence of a history of occupational and wage discrimination against women. Specifically, women may develop lower adaptation levels for their pay or lower pay expectations than men (Sauser & York, 1978). These lower pay expectations may then serve as a lower comparative referent against which women evaluate how much pay they deserve. A second possible mechanism is restricted social comparisons. For example, in judging what they deserve, women and men may compare primarily with same-sex and/or same-job others. Because women typically are paid less than men, and people working in female-dominated jobs are paid less than those working in male-dominated jobs (Treiman & Hartmann, 1981), the

> comparative referents acquired by such similarity-based social comparisons may be lower for women than men. Hence, on the basis of such comparisons, women may feel entitled to less than men do. (Major, 1987a, p. 132)

Most of the research dealing with sex differences in personal entitlement and/or allocation patterns was done with undergraduates as subjects (Major & Adams, 1983; Major & Konar, 1984; Major, McFarlin & Gagnon, 1984; Callahan-Levy & Messe, 1979; Kahn, Nelson & Gaeddert, 1980; McFarlin, Major, Frone & Konar, 1984; Reis & Jackson, 1981; Summers, Sightler & Stahl, 1992; Stake, 1985; Jackson, Messe & Hunter, 1985; Leventhal & Lane, 1970; Boldizar, Perry & Perry, 1988; Major, Bylsma & Cozzarelli, 1989). Some of these studies show clear sex differences in personal entitlement and/or reward allocation; others yield mixed or inconclusive results. The researchers give varied explanations for their findings of sex differences, favoring either value-based or social comparison suppositions, and ranging across the psychological, social, and interactionist paradigms.

It appears that Crosby's 1982 study of attitudinal differences between high-prestige and low-prestige employed women, and between employed men and housewives, is the only examination in the area of interest to this research that has attempted to match subjects on high-status social background. Job-related deservedness was among the variables included in the study. Crosby assessed

deservedness via straightforward questions; no reliability or validity data for the concept of deservedness were presented. In short, concluded Crosby (1982), "Despite objective sex discrimination, job attitudes do not depend on sex. The employed women and men in our sample are virtually indistinguishable concerning their feelings toward their jobs . . . ." Crosby referred to this as the "paradox of the contented female worker"; however, she also found that high-prestige individuals--women and men--resented the treatment of women workers more than did low-prestige women and men (pp. 12-13). The question whether sex differences in personal entitlement and allocation pattern holds for subjects in high-status academic positions is an important one. If such differences are not maintained, then the only plausible explanation for the existence of a difference in the first place is the disadvantaged status of women in general, or the influence of socioeconomic factors on behavior (e.g., wage discrimination, androcentric culture orientation, polarization of work domains, downplaying of educational achievements in favor of family and childcare orientation as primary factors in women's lives, etc.).

A. Androcentric society fosters inequitable distribution of rewards on the basis of sex differences.

B. Survival of androcentrism is dependent on adherence to traditional gender roles.

C. Research focusing on sex differences in behavior and attitudes inadvertently maintains inequality of equity ratio based on sex differences as equitable.

D. Feminist research demonstrates that when subjects are closely matched for social background factors, sex differences disappear.

F. Substituting individual differences for sex differences forces weighting of human characteristics (combining characteristics of both sexes simultaneously) as a basis for reward differential in the equity ratio.

F(1). Androgyny defies traditional gender-role socialization. Women in powerful professional positions within androcentric society may have had to develop androgynous traits to acquire their "nontraditional" positions in society.



Figure 1

Theoretical Model

A. Theories of sex difference:
biological
genetic
psychosocial (values)
socioeconomic

B. Different explanations for sex differences in personal entitlement and reward allocation:
B(1): psychosocial--values, socialization
B(2): socioeconomic--socialization, disadvantaged position of women

C. Feminist research demonstrates that when subjects are closely matched for socioeconomic background, sex differences disappear.

D. University professors (matched for rank and years of experience) will be tested for differences in personal entitlement, reward allocation, and gender role.

D(1). Gender role of subjects will be included in the study since androgyny defies traditional gender roles, which in research usually translate into sex differences. Women in powerful professional and academic positions may have had to transcend traditional gender roles by acquiring androgynous traits. Therefore subjects' gender role is a variable of interest to this research.

F. If, in subjects matched for powerful academic/professional background, sex differences turn into individual differences, then previous findings of sex differences in personal entitlement and reward allocation can be explained by the disadvantaged position of women in society in general.



Figure 2

Research Model

CHAPTER III

METHODOLOGY

Overview

The purpose of this study is to investigate males' and females' job-related personal entitlement and reward allocation preferences. Specifically, this study analyzes similarities and differences in these variables for subjects matched on high-status social and intellectual background (i.e., university professors) and explores relationships among the variables and the subjects' gender roles. A qualitative portion of this study investigates subjects' evaluations of the fairness of the treatment they have received in their university and their speculations on reasons they may have been treated unfairly. Chapter III contains an explanation of the research methodology and procedures used in this study. The chapter is divided into four major sections: (a) subjects; (b) procedures; (c) instrumentation; and (d) data analysis.

Population

The subjects for this study were selected from a pool of faculty members at a state university in Florida. As of

1994, there were a total of 3,029 regular, full-time faculty members at the site selected for the study. That number may be further broken down as follows:

Table 1

Regular, Full-Time Faculty by Rank and Employment Status

Rank	Total	Male	Female
Eminent Scholar	34	32	2
Graduate Research Professor	47	45	2
Distinguished Service/ Research Professor	20	18	2
Professor	1,221	1,108	113
Associate Professor	908	729	179
Assistant Professor	678	449	229
Instructor	121	44	77
TOTAL	3,029	2,425	604

Source: Office of Academic Affairs (March 1994).

Prior to contacting the subjects, permission was gained from the University of Florida Human Institutional Review Board (see Appendix A). Each participant received a cover letter with an Informed Consent stipulation (see Appendix B) enclosed in his or her survey package.

Sample

An initial sample of 600 subjects was computer generated in no particular order from the population of 3,029 university professors. Computer-generated address labels were obtained from the Office of Academic Affairs. Stratification by sex and rank ensured equal representation, with 100 subjects in each of six groups (see Table 2).

Table 2

Stratification by Sex and Rank

	Male	Female
Professor	100	100
Associate Professor	100	100
Assistant Professor	100	100
Totals	300	300
COMBINED TOTAL	600	

The return rate exceeded 50%. 326 returned surveys were obtained out of 600 mailed. 11 surveys were not included in the study because they were received after the data had been analyzed. Out of the 315 observations, only 310 to 314 could be included in quantitative data analyses because of missing values.

The resultant number of observations on the basis of

sex, gender role (IDI), professional rank, and years of experience are shown in Table 3.

Table 3

Frequencies of Observations for Independent Variables

Rank	Frequency
Assistant	102
Associate	101
Full	111

Sex	Frequency
Male	146
Female	168

IDI	Frequency
Masculine	98
Feminine	54
Androgynous	39
Undifferentiated	119

Years of Experience	Frequency
0-5 years	79
6-10 years	54
Over 10 years	181

Rank by Sex

Rank	Male	Female	Total
Assistant	47	55	102
Associate	43	58	101
Full	56	55	111
Total	146	168	314

Complete two-way frequencies for independent variables are summarized in Appendix E.

Procedures

A list of faculty school addresses was obtained from the Office of Academic Affairs. Each of the 600 selected professors was mailed a survey package with the assessment instruments (see Appendix C), a cover letter with an Informed Consent stipulation (see Appendix B), and a return-addressed envelope. Campus mail service eliminated the need to provide stamps. The subjects were informed of the confidential nature of the research in order to reduce the social desirability response tendency and to increase the return rate.

The nature of the assessment task entailed surveying the subjects in a real-life setting as opposed to a simulated one. A 50% return rate was considered acceptable (Ray & Ravizza, 1988). With a return rate below 50%, follow-up letters with another enclosed copy of the instruments were to be mailed to the subjects.

Design

For purposes of this research an ex post facto survey study was designed. Computer-generated, stratified random selection of subjects ensured adequate representation of subjects by sex and professional rank.

Sex, gender role, professional rank, and years of postdoctoral professional experience were independent variables. Job-related personal entitlement and reward

allocation pattern were dependent variables.

Hypotheses

In this study the following hypotheses were examined.

Ho(1): There is no effect on preference for equity or equality as a reward allocation pattern by sex, after controlling for gender role, professional rank, and years of postdoctoral professional experience.

Ho(2): There is no effect on job-related personal entitlement by sex, after controlling for gender role, professional rank, and years of postdoctoral professional experience.

Instrumentation, Technical Data

Two instruments--(1) Interpersonal Disposition Inventory (Berzins, Welling & Wetter, 1981; see Appendix C), (2) Equity/Equality Scale (Rasinski, 1987; see Appendix C)--and a direct questioning measure (Appendix C) were utilized in assessing subjects' gender role, reward allocation pattern, and job-related personal entitlement, respectively.

Measure of Fairness-Related Principles

The technical data for the following instrument are borrowed from Rasinski (1987). Rasinski's measure of Fairness-Related Principles: proportionality and

egalitarianism are compared in the assessment of subjects' reward allocation patterns. The instrument consists of eleven items: five related to equitable (proportional) and six to equal (egalitarian) principles of distribution. An examination of the factor loading in this two-factor measure revealed that all items loaded significantly on their respective factor.

The first factor represents the value of proportionality in the distribution of social resources. The items on this factor express a sentiment toward rewarding individual contribution to society and withholding benefits to individuals who do not contribute. The second factor represents the value of egalitarianism in the distribution of resources. Items on this factor express the sentiment of equal access to basic services, equal treatment of all members of society, and the redistribution of wealth.

Further analysis of the scale concerned the construct validity of the two value dimensions. To examine the construct validity of the two value dimensions, value scales were constructed from the individual value items. Correlations of the value scales with the 18 "instrumental" values of the Rokeach Value Survey and the "materialist" and "postmaterialist" political values of Inglehart (1977) were observed.

Although the two dimensions were not totally independent, more than two-thirds of the variance in each

latent factor was unexplained by the other factor.

Rasinski (1987) tested convergent validity by observing whether the two social value dimensions formed meaningful patterns of relations with other values. Proportionality correlated most highly with the valuing of independence, imagination, and ambition: traits that seem to reflect a conservative, work-ethic orientation toward social life. Egalitarianism correlated most highly with traits such as broad-minded, forgiving, helpful, and loving.

Proportionality and egalitarianism correlated about equally, but in opposite directions, with self-reported liberalism/conservatism. Those endorsing proportionality tended to say they were politically conservative, whereas those endorsing egalitarianism tended to say they were politically liberal. Although men tended to endorse proportionality more often then women did, there was no significant relationship between sex and the endorsement of egalitarianism.

No information was presented concerning the scale's reliability. Therefore, upon data analysis KR-20 was utilized for the purpose of estimating the scale's item homogeneity.

Interpersonal Disposition Inventory (IDI) of the Personality Research Form ANDRO Scale

The technical data for the following instrument were borrowed from Berzins, Welling, and Wetter (1981). The IDI scale drew its theoretical rationale from Bem's Sex Role Inventory (BSRI) but was developed from the items of multiscale personality inventory, the Personality Research Form (PRF, Jackson, 1967). The masculinity and femininity subscales of the BSRI were regarded by the authors of IDI as principal criteria for assessment of its convergent validity.

Scale independence and reliability

The MASCUL and FEMIN subscales of IDI may be regarded as essentially orthogonal. In two large samples of college undergraduates (386 men and 723 women), correlations between the two subscales were -.05 and -.11 for men and -.16 and -.24 for women.

Despite the intentional heterogeneity of the MASCUL and FEMIN contents, internal consistency (alpha) coefficients in seven different large samples ranged from .68 to .79 (Mdn = .75) for MASCUL and from .65 to .70 (Mdn = .67) for FEMIN. Initial estimates of the temporal stability over a three-week interval have averaged .81 for both MASCUL and FEMIN.

Convergent and discriminant validity

Both subscales show appreciable convergences with their counterparts in the BSRI (Bem, 1974) and the PAQ (Spence,

Helmreich & Stapp, 1975). The convergent coefficients range from .42 to .68 and are all highly significant. While the magnitude of these coefficients does not suggest that these instruments are interchangeable, they attest to substantial similarities among Masculinity and Femininity constructs embodied in them. In contrast, the six correlations between MASCUL and FEMIN and "traditional" Masculinity-Femininity scales range in magnitude from .00 to only .22, indicating that the subscales of the IDI scale are quite dissimilar from scales constructed on the basis of sex differences in item endorsement (e.g., the OPI MF scale, Heist & Yonge, 1968) or differences between groups differing in sexual preference (e.g., the MMPI MF scale).

Scoring

In its 85-item form, the IDI contains the 29-item MASCUL and 27-item FEMIN subscales, a 20-item self-esteem scale, five items from the PRF Infrequency scale (to control for careless responses--if more than one of these is answered in the keyed direction, the respondent may be excluded from analysis in most samples), and four filler items. A 65-item IDI form (29 MASCUL items, 27 FEMIN items, and five items from the infrequency scale) was used in this research. The 20-item self-esteem scale, for which separate validation is provided by the authors, was excluded, as only Femininity-Masculinity scale scores are of interest for the present study.

Following the procedure used by Bem (1977), the authors of IDI performed median splits on the distributions of scores on the Masculinity and Femininity scales separately, after combining the sexes. In this manner, Masculinity scores of 15 or greater and 14 or less were designated, respectively, high and low; the corresponding Femininity scale values were 17 or greater and 16 or less. The categories thereby created were termed "androgynous" (high masculinity/high femininity), "masculine typed" (high masculinity/low femininity), "feminine typed" (high femininity/low masculinity), and "indeterminate" (low on both).

The analysis of PRF ANDRO scale items (plus gender) yielded 18 eigenvalues greater than 1.0. Application of the scree test suggested the advisability of rotating only eight factors (34% of variance), of which seven were interpreted.

The four factors defined exclusively by Masculinity items referred to social-intellectual ascendancy (e.g., "I seek out positions of authority"), autonomy (e.g., "If I have a problem, I like to work it out alone"), orientation toward risk (e.g., "I avoid some sports and hobbies because of their dangerous nature," keyed false), and individualism (e.g., "I don't care if my clothes are unstylish, as long as I like them"). The two factors defined exclusively by PRF Femininity items addressed nurturance (e.g., "When I see a baby, I often ask to hold it"), and a blend of affiliative

concerns and self-subordination (e.g., "I like to be with people who assume a protective attitude toward me"). The former (nurturance) dimension showed the highest loading for gender (.70) among the factors. The seventh factor included three Femininity items (e.g., "I am usually the first to offer a helping hand when it is needed") and two Masculinity items (e.g., "When I see a new invention I attempt to find out how it works"), collectively denoting helpful initiative.

Assessing Job-Related Personal Entitlement / Deservedness

Subjects' sense of job-related personal entitlement or perception of a fair reward allocation for their work input was assessed through a straightforward question pertaining to their salary, with a choice of nine answers to the question (Jasso and Rossi, 1977). The measure of personal entitlement was stated in the following form:

> This question pertains to your judgment of the fairness of your salary.
>
> Please circle the number (from one to nine) of the answer best representing your judgment as to your present salary:
>
> 1. Extremely underpaid (-4)
> 2. Much underpaid (-3)
> 3. Somewhat underpaid (-2)
> 4. Slightly underpaid (-1)
> 5. Fairly paid (0)
> 6. Slightly overpaid (+1)

7. Somewhat overpaid (+2)
8. Much overpaid (+3)
9. Extremely overpaid (+4)

The numerical labels of Jasso and Rossi's scale, which ranges from -4 through zero to +4, were utilized in determining the subject's PE (personal entitlement) score.

Jasso and Rossi (1977), in their empirical exploration of the normative criteria for just distribution of earned income, have employed this type of reasoning in construing "the nine category fairness-rating scale," which is essentially the "best and simplest model of justice evaluations consistent with their [subjects'] income data" (Jasso & Rossi, 1977, p. 647). Jasso and Rossi (1977) used their scale to assess perceptions of a fair reward allocation made by a third party. In the present research this assessment was made by the participants with reference to their own income data. However, no formal analysis of the reliability or validity of this measure is presented by the authors. Jasso and Rossi (1977) state that

> [o]ur research design . . . assumes that persons, in fact, make judgments about the fairness or relative unfairness of resource allocation. Happily, this is a short-lived assumption, since data collection soon confirms it. We further assume that the individual's justice conceptual space is a continuum with a mid-point of fairness and two extreme poles of unfairness. Since the zero point represents fairness, we regard the fairness measure as a continuous scale of degrees of unfair payment ranging from underpaid through a midpoint of fair payment to extreme overpayment. (p. 644)

The authors also state that the major weakness of the scale

is that the discrete category values reduce the fairness determinations that respondents may want to make in their justice discriminations, forcing them to stay within a set range and to round off their judgment (Jasso & Rossi, 1977).

> We assume that rounding errors are unbiased, i.e. have a mean of zero. The scale's major strength is that the combined use of verbal and numerical labels may evoke a sense of intervalness. Our hope that we have attained a better-than-ordinal scale hinges on these labels (and on the large number of ratings). (p. 645)

Essentially, this measure's validity rests on the expert judgment of Jasso and Rossi (1977), who in turn rely in their reasoning on the expert judgment of Berger et al. (1972). "[S]traightforward comparison between what an individual of such-and-such characteristics ought to earn and what s/he in fact does earn, [is] precisely the model suggested by Berger et al. (1972)" (Jasso & Rossi, 1977).

Straightforward questioning in regard to the measure of deservedness or personal entitlement appears to be the method of choice in Crosby's (1982) study as well. Crosby (1982) assessed deservedness via straightforward questions; no reliability or validity data for the concept of job-related deservedness were presented in her influential study. Crosby's measure of "deserving" concerning one's job has also served as a source for constructing the measure of job-related personal entitlement in the present study. The following is an example of one of the questions Crosby used in her measure of "deserving" (1982, p. 221):

Would you say that your pay and fringe benefits are (READ LIST):

Better than you deserve 1

What you deserve 2

Slightly less than you deserve 3

Much less than you deserve 4

Since there is very little in the way of an established instrument, in addition to the question measuring deservedness two qualitative questions were included for exploratory purposes:

When you think about how you, as compared to your colleagues, have been rewarded by the University, how do you feel?

Have you been treated fairly? If not, why not?

Data Analysis

In order to determine the effect of four independent variables (sex, gender role, rank, and postdoctoral experience) on personal entitlement and fairness-related allocation principles, an ANOVA was conducted. An alpha level of .05 was the accepted level of significance.

The advantage of ANOVA is that it allows for scientific examination of the effects of several independent variables, both individually and collectively, on dependent variables. ANOVA reduces experimental error and increases statistical power through the reduction of within-group variance, thus

controlling for Type I error. The analysis of variance helps to determine whether the interaction effect between the independent variables and the dependent variables is statistically significant.

Assumptions involved in the use of ANOVA include:

1. Normality of distribution;

2. Homoscedasticity or equal variances within each group;

3. Independence of groups and subjects. Post hoc comparisons of significant groups' means will follow the computation of the interaction effect.

The research design (2 x 3 x 3 x 4 ANOVA) is illustrated by Table 4.

Table 4

Sex	Rank	Years of Experience	Gender Role
Male	Professor	0-5 years	Feminine
	Associate Prof.	6-10 years	Masculine
	Assistant Prof.	over 10 years	Androgynous
			Indeterminate
Female	Professor	0-5 years	Feminine
	Associate Prof.	6-10 years	Masculine
	Assistant Prof.	over 10 years	Androgynous
			Indeterminate

The dependent variables are:

1. Job-Related Personal Entitlement;

2. Fairness-Related Allocation Principles or reward allocation pattern.

The data from the statistical procedures are reported and analyzed in Chapter IV.

CHAPTER IV

RESULTS

Introduction

This study was designed to determine whether university professors' job-related personal entitlement and reward allocation patterns (equal vs. equitable) are related to their sex, after controlling for gender role, professional rank (full, associate, or assistant professor), and years of postdoctoral experience (0-5, 6-10, or over 10).

A 2 x 3 x 3 x 4 ANOVA design was used to test the two null hypotheses in this study. Statistical analyses of the data were conducted using the general linear model procedure of the SAS program. Duncan's multiple range test was utilized in follow-up analyses.

The question as to which gender role orientation is more common to individuals in prestigious socioeconomic levels of our society (university professors) was also of interest to this investigation.

A qualitative component of the study is presented in participants' views on the extent of fairness with which they are treated in the university context (Appendix D) and is discussed in the next chapter.

Analysis

The ANOVA models for both null hypotheses were analyzed with first-order interactions. The interactions that did not show statistical significance were removed, and the models were then run with only the significant interactions. Question # 14 of the survey was dropped from the analysis because of its low factor loading (Rasinski, 1987).

The presentation of the data is organized according to the four research questions of the study. The first research question asked: Is there a difference between males and females, matched on high-status social background, in their sense of job-related personal entitlement and their reward allocation preference? It was addressed by the two null hypotheses of the study.

Results for Ho(1) concerning equality as a reward allocation pattern

Ho(1) stated: There is no effect on preference for equity or equality as a reward allocation pattern by sex, after gender role, professional rank, and years of postdoctoral professional experience have been controlled for.

The ANOVA model for Ho(1)'s equality aspect was analyzed with first-order interactions. Interactions that did not show statistical significance were removed, and the

model was then run with significant interactions only. The IDI by rank interaction was no longer significant for the reduced model. The results are shown in Table 5. The null hypothesis (1) for equality as a reward allocation strategy was not rejected.

Table 5

ANOVA: Equality

Source	DF	Type III SS	F value	Pr > F
Sex	1	0.72	1.87	0.1728
IDI	3	5.13	4.43	0.0046*
Rank	2	1.80	2.33	0.0988
Years Exp.	2	2.34	3.04	0.0496*
IDI x Rank	6	3.53	1.53	0.1692
Error	295	113.65		

* Values with an asterisk are significant at the alpha level of 0.05.

Table 6 shows the means for IDI (gender role) levels.

Table 6

IDI Means

Levels of IDI	Mean
Masculine	2.36
Undifferentiated	2.23
Androgynous	2.12
Feminine	2.00

Duncan post hoc analysis showed that the differences in IDI were between the masculine and androgynous, masculine and feminine, and undifferentiated and feminine gender roles.

The means for the years of experience variable are shown in Table 7. Duncan post hoc analysis indicated that subjects with 0-5 years of experience were more equality-oriented than subjects with 6-10 and over 10 years of experience.

Table 7

Years of Experience Means

Levels of Experience	Mean
0-5 Years	2.10
6-10 Years	2.25
Over 10 Years	2.26

Results for Ho(1) concerning equity as a reward allocation pattern

Ho(1) stated: There is no effect on preference for equity or equality as a reward allocation pattern by sex, after gender role, professional rank, and years of postdoctoral professional experience have been controlled for.

The ANOVA model for Ho(1)'s equity aspect was analyzed with first-order interactions. Interactions that did not show statistical significance were removed, and the model

was then run with significant interactions only. The IDI by rank interaction was no longer significant for the reduced model. The results are reported in Table 8. The means for sex are reported in Table 9. The null hypothesis (1) for equity as a reward allocation pattern was rejected.

Table 8

ANOVA: Equity

Source	DF	Type III SS	F value	Pr > F
Sex	1	10.95	18.10	0.0001*
IDI	3	0.67	0.40	0.7745
Rank	2	0.37	0.31	0.7343
Years Exp.	2	0.63	0.52	0.5950
IDI x Rank	6	6.00	1.70	0.1331
Error	295	178.47		

* Values with an asterisk are significant at the alpha level of 0.05.

Table 9

Means for Sex

Sex	Mean
Male	3.50
Female	3.11

Females showed statistically significantly greater

preference for equity as a reward allocation strategy than males did.

The results for Ho(2)

Ho(2) stated: There is no effect on job-related personal entitlement by sex, after gender role, professional rank, and years of postdoctoral professional experience have been controlled for.

The ANOVA model for Ho(2) was analyzed with first-order interactions. Interactions that did not show statistical significance were removed, and the model was then run with significant interactions only. In the reduced model for Ho(2) only the IDI by rank interaction was significant. The results are shown in Table 10. The observed interaction is reported in Table 11. The null hypothesis (2) was not rejected.

Table 10

ANOVA: Entitlement

Source	DF	Type III SS	F value	Pr > F
Sex	1	1.22	0.69	0.4067
IDI	3	3.47	0.65	0.5811
Rank	2	13.10	3.68	0.0265*
Years Exp.	2	9.43	2.67	0.0710
Sex x Years	2	4.49	1.27	0.2821
IDI x Rank	6	32.67	3.08	0.0061*
Error	295	514.20		

* Values with an asterisk are significant at the alpha level of 0.05.

Table 11

Rank by IDI Means

Prof. Rank	IDI (Gender)			
	Androg.	Femin.	Mascul.	Undiff.
Assistant	2.54	3.11	3.00	3.73
Associate	3.92	3.68	3.53	3.00
Full	3.62	3.50	3.33	3.70

According to the results of Duncan post hoc analysis, for subjects with androgynous, feminine, and masculine gender roles, the lowest sense of entitlement was among associate professors, followed in ascending order by full professors and assistant professors. For subjects with undifferentiated gender roles, the lowest sense of entitlement was among assistant professors, followed in ascending order by full professors and associate professors. Within the professional ranks, gender role related to job-related personal entitlement as follows. Among assistant professors, the lowest sense of entitlement was shown by individuals of undifferentiated gender role, followed in ascending order by feminine, masculine, and androgynous ones. Among associate professors, the lowest sense of

entitlement was exhibited by individuals of androgynous gender role, followed in ascending order by feminine, masculine, and undifferentiated ones. Among full professors, the lowest sense of entitlement was found in individuals of undifferentiated gender role, followed in ascending order by androgynous, feminine, and masculine ones.

Because of the rank by IDI interactions, the means for the interactions were analyzed columnwise and rowwise for statistical significance, by first fixing the levels of rank and analyzing the mean differences in IDI, and then fixing the levels of IDI and analyzing the mean differences in rank. Results of Duncan post hoc analysis for IDI fixed at masculine gender are shown in Table 12.

Table 12

IDI (Masculine) by Rank Means

Mean	Rank
3.53	Assoc.
3.33	Full
3.00	Asst.

The results of Duncan post hoc analysis for IDI fixed at the masculine level show no statistical significance. The results of Duncan post hoc analysis for IDI fixed at the feminine level are shown in Table 13.

Table 13

IDI (Feminine) by Rank Means

Mean	Rank
3.70	Assoc.
3.50	Full
3.11	Asst.

No statistical significance was found for IDI fixed at the feminine level. The results of Duncan post hoc analysis for IDI fixed at the androgynous level are shown in Table 14.

Table 14

IDI (Androgynous) by Rank Means

Mean	Rank
3.92	Assoc.*
3.62	Full
2.54	Asst.*

* Values with an asterisk are significant at the alpha level of 0.05.

Androgynous associate professors have a significantly lower, and androgynous assistant professors a significantly higher, sense of job-related personal entitlement, according to the results of Duncan post hoc analysis for IDI fixed at the androgynous level. The results of Duncan post hoc analysis for IDI fixed at the undifferentiated gender role

level are shown in Table 15.

Table 15

IDI (Undifferentiated) by Rank Means

Mean	Rank
3.73	Asst.
3.70	Full
3.00	Assoc.*

* Values with an asterisk are significant at the alpha level of 0.05.

According to the results of Duncan post hoc analysis for IDI fixed at the undifferentiated level, associate professors with an undifferentiated gender role showed a significantly higher sense of job-related personal entitlement than either assistant or full professors.

The mean differences in rank were analyzed by fixing the levels of IDI. The results of Duncan post hoc analysis for rank fixed at the associate professor level are shown in Table 16.

Table 16

Rank (Associate) by IDI Means

Mean	IDI
3.92	Androg.*
3.69	Femin.
3.53	Mascul.
3.00	Undiff.*

* Values with an asterisk are significant at the alpha level of 0.05.

According to the results of Duncan post hoc analysis with rank fixed at the associate level, associate professors with an androgynous gender role showed a significantly lower sense of job-related personal entitlement than professors with an undifferentiated gender role.

The results of Duncan post hoc analysis for rank fixed at the assistant professor level are shown in Table 17.

Table 17

Rank (Assistant) by IDI Means

Mean	IDI
3.73	Undiff.*
3.11	Femin.
3.00	Mascul.
2.538	Androg.*

* Values with an asterisk are significant at the alpha level of 0.05.

According to the results of Duncan post hoc analysis with rank fixed at the assistant level, assistant professors with an undifferentiated gender role showed a significantly lower sense of job-related personal entitlement than professors with an androgynous gender role.

The results of Duncan post hoc analysis for rank fixed at the full professor level are shown in Table 18.

Table 18

Rank (Full) by IDI Means

Mean	IDI
3.70	Undiff.
3.62	Androg.
3.50	Femin.
3.33	Mascul.

No statistical significance was found for rank fixed at the full professor level, according to Duncan post hoc analysis.

Results for the second research question

Research question two asked: Is there a relationship among any two or more of each: subjects' gender role, job-related personal entitlement, reward allocation preference, professional rank, and years of postdoctoral professional experience? The answer to the second research question is affirmative. There is a statistically significant relationship between subjects' preference for equality as a reward allocation pattern, their gender role, and their years of postdoctoral professional experience. The means for IDI (gender role) and years of experience are shown in Tables 6 and 7 respectively. There is also a statistically significant interaction of IDI by professional rank in its relation to job-related personal entitlement. The means for IDI by rank interaction are shown in Table 11.

Results for the third research question

Research question number three of the study asked: Are university professors significantly more androgynous, as opposed to traditional or undifferentiated, in their gender roles? The answer to this question is negative. Chi-Square analysis was used to determine whether there is a statistically significant relationship between sex and gender. The results of Chi-Square analysis show that the observed and expected values of the variables in question are not different, warranting the rejection of androgyny as a significantly predominant gender role in the sample. In fact, there was no statistically significant relationship between sex and any of the gender roles. The question of the role of androgyny in the subjects' gender role orientation is addressed in Table 19.

Table 19

Frequencies / Percentages of Sex by IDI (Gender Role)

Sex	IDI				
	Mascul.	Femin.	Androg.	Undiff.	TOTAL
Male	53/17.10	24/7.74	15/4.84	53/17.10	145/46.77%
Female	45/14.52	30/9.68	24/7.74	66/21.29	165/53.23%
TOTAL	98/31.61	54/17.42	39/12.58	119/38.39	310/100%

Statistics for Table 19

Statistic	DF	Value	Prob.
Chi-Square	3	3.54	0.315

Results for the fourth research question

Research question number four of the study asked: How do university professors perceive their treatment by the university, do they differ by sex in dissatisfaction with their treatment, and what reasons do they present for perceived unfairness in the way they are treated? This question presents the qualitative portion of the study.

182 responses to the qualitative portion of the survey were obtained. 132 subjects did not provide qualitative responses.

The two qualitative questions were:

83. When you think about how you, as compared to your colleagues, have been rewarded by the University, how do you feel?

84. Have you been treated fairly? If not, why not?

88 subjects provided "OK/fine/fair" types of brief answers to these questions. 93 subjects provided more extensive written comments. Chi-Square analysis was used to determine whether there was a statistically significant relationship between sex and perception of fairness/unfairness. The

results of the Chi-Square analysis show no statistical significance, meaning the subjects did not differ significantly by sex in their perception of fairness/unfairness. Table 20 summarizes the frequency of responses to question 84 by sex.

Table 20

Perception of Treatment by the University

	Male	Female
Fair	56	69
Unfair	37	40
TOTAL	93	109

Statistics for Table 20

Statistic	DF	Value	Prob.
Chi-Square	1	1.4	0.237

93 subjects (53 females and 40 males) provided comments speculating on the reasons for their treatment by the University. These comments are presented in their entirety in Appendix D. They have been arranged in the order of subjects' sex, rank, years of postdoctoral professional experience, and age.

The interpretation of the results of this study follows in Chapter V.

CHAPTER V

DISCUSSION

The purpose of this study was fourfold. First, it was to determine whether sex differences in work-related personal entitlement and reward allocation patterns disappear when subjects are matched on intellectually high-status social background. Second, the relationship among subjects' sex, gender role, sense of personal entitlement, reward allocation pattern, professional rank, and years of postdoctoral professional experience was investigated. Third, it was also of interest whether androgyny would emerge as a gender role specific to individuals of a prestigious socioeconomic background. In addition, participants in the study were invited to evaluate the fairness of the treatment they receive in their university and to speculate on the reasons they may have been treated unfairly. The latter was a qualitative (fourth) portion of the study and the subjects' answers are presented in Appendix D. Aspects of the theoretical underpinnings of the study were addressed as well.

The results clearly support the proposition that there are no sex differences in the preference for equal reward

allocation patterns. However, subjects' gender role had the following influence on the equality orientation in reward distribution: Individuals with a masculine gender role were less equality oriented than feminine or androgynous ones; and individuals with undifferentiated gender roles showed less preference for equality in reward distribution than those with a feminine gender role. Subjects' years of experience had the following effect on their preference for equality in reward allocation: Professors with 0-5 years of postdoctoral professional experience were more equality-oriented than those with 6-10 years and over 10 years experience.

Sex was also not a factor in determining subjects' sense of work-related personal entitlement. The effect of gender role by rank interaction on job-related personal entitlement was as follows. For subjects with androgynous, feminine, and masculine gender roles, the lowest sense of entitlement was among associate professors, followed in ascending order by full professors and assistant professors. For subjects with undifferentiated gender roles, the lowest sense of entitlement was among assistant professors, followed in ascending order by full professors and associate professors. Within the professional ranks, gender role related to job-related personal entitlement as follows. Among assistant professors, the lowest sense of entitlement was shown by individuals of undifferentiated gender role,

followed in ascending order by feminine, masculine, and androgynous ones. Among associate professors, the lowest sense of entitlement was exhibited by individuals of androgynous gender role, followed in ascending order by feminine, masculine, and undifferentiated ones. Among full professors, the lowest sense of entitlement was found in individuals of undifferentiated gender role, followed in ascending order by androgynous, feminine, and masculine ones.

The following data were found to be statistically significant for the gender role by professional rank interaction in its relation to subjects' sense of job-related personal entitlement. In terms of subjects' gender role, androgynous associate professors had a significantly lower, and assistant professors a significantly higher, sense of entitlement. Associate professors with an undifferentiated gender role showed significantly higher levels of entitlement than either assistant or full professors. By rank, associate professors of an androgynous gender role were significantly lower in their sense of entitlement than those of an undifferentiated gender role. On the other hand, at the level of assistant professors, those with an undifferentiated gender role showed a significantly lower sense of entitlement than androgynous ones.

Sex differences were found in subjects' preference for

equitable reward distribution patterns, contrary to the study's alternative hypotheses of no sex differences and contrary to the findings of most previous investigations.

Previous research on sex differences in justice-related judgment is typified by the view that women's greater concern for interpersonal relationships, and lesser interest in outcomes such as money, leads them (a) to prefer more equal reward distributions, and (b) to be similarly satisfied with their jobs and pay despite their underpayment relative to comparable men (Major, 1985).

The findings of this study do not support either this outlook or the results of the bulk of previous research in the area of interest. No sex difference was found in the subjects' job-related personal entitlement; and the female subjects' preference in reward distribution reflected equity as opposed to equality.

Among the authors who have found that women tend to allocate rewards more equally, and men more equitably, are: Kahn et al. (1980), Major and Deaux (1982), Sampson (1975), Leventhal (1976), Major and Adams (1983), Swap and Rubin (1983), Watts, Vallacher and Messe (1982), Olejnik (1982), and Stake (1983). Sex differences in reward allocation patterns were not observed in the studies of Coon, Lane and Lichtman (1974), Lane and Coon (1972), and Streator and Chertkoff (1976). Boldizar, Perry and Perry (1988) found that females (preadolescent and college-age subjects)

preferred equitable distributions, contrary to the popular expectation.

Findings of sex differences in work-related personal entitlement are just as numerous and the authors are rather unanimous in their conclusion: women's preferences in work domains reflect less of a sense of entitlement than men's (Major, Bylsma & Cozzarelli, 1989; Leventhal & Lane, 1970; Callahan-Levy & Messe, 1979; Summers, 1988; Jackson & Grabski, 1988; Major, McFarlin & Gagnon, 1984; Major et al., 1987).

A major distinction between the above-listed studies and the present one lies in the crucial difference in the selection of subjects. With the exception of Crosby's (1982) study, virtually all the others had as their subjects undergraduate students, persons in modest status occupations, or children and adolescents. University professors were the subjects in this study. An enormous socioeconomic gap and difference in intellectual prestige separates undergraduate students and university professors. If socioeconomic advantage and equal access to intellectual pursuits are all that is needed to expunge sex differences in gender roles and in job-related personal entitlement, and radically change the typical sex-linked reward allocation strategy in individuals, then the only plausible explanation for the findings of sex differences in the above studies is the disadvantaged status of women in general, consistently

documented by socioeconomic indicators.

In Rasinski's (1987) research conclusions the observed value of equity correlated most highly with valuing independence, imagination, and ambition--traits that seem to reflect a conservative, work-ethic orientation toward social life (Rasinski, 1987). He further concluded that an equality orientation or "[e]galitarianism correlated most highly with traits such as broad-minded, forgiving, helpful, and loving. Respondents endorsing this value downplayed individual effort as the source of their accomplishments or failures and emphasized social interdependence." Rasinski (1987) also found that the two value dimensions differed with respect to their relation to Inglehart's (1977) "materialist" and "postmaterialist" values.

> Those endorsing proportionality believed that it was very important for America to maintain a high rate of economic growth (Materialist 1) and strong defense forces (Materialist 2). However, they rated the protection of freedom of speech in America (Postmaterialist 1) and giving citizens more say in government decisions (Postmaterialist 2) as less important. Those endorsing egalitarianism showed the opposite pattern. They especially emphasized the importance of giving citizens more say in government decisions and played down the importance of making sure America has strong defense forces.
>
> Proportionality and egalitarianism correlated about equally, but in opposite directions, with self-reported liberalism/conservatism. Those endorsing proportionality tended to say they were politically conservative, whereas those endorsing egalitarianism tended to say they were politically liberal. Although men tended to endorse proportionality more often than women did, there was no significant relation between sex and the endorsement of egalitarianism. (Rasinski, 1987, p. 204)

The subjects in Rasinski's (1987) study were undergraduate students.

The answer to the question whether androgyny emerges as a gender role specific to individuals of prestigious socioeconomic background is negative. The undifferentiated gender role was overwhelmingly predominant in the sample; however, between the sexes, no statistically significant difference in gender roles was found, in contrast to previous research (Berzins et al., 1978; Bem, 1981). The undifferentiated gender role characterization results when a subject scores low on both the masculine and feminine scales of the instrument. In previous research, the androgynous gender role has been linked to higher levels of moral development, intellectualism, and competence; whereas the undifferentiated gender role has been described as characteristic of individuals with lower levels of social competence, tendencies toward dependency, impulsiveness, and not particularly high intellectualism (Berzins et al., 1978). Berzins et al. (1978) had also emphasized "the pervasive and highly significant sex differences" on the two traditional role scales, with females scoring highest on the feminine scale and males scoring highest on the masculine scale in almost every sample. Bem's (1977) normative sample for her Sex Role Inventory (undergraduate subjects) yielded the following data: "39% of females are classified as feminine, 12% as masculine, 30% as androgynous, and 18% as

undifferentiated. For males, the corresponding percentages are 12, 42, 20, and 27" (Bem, 1981). The findings of the present study--showing that out of the total sample of 310 professors, 119 held an undifferentiated gender role, followed by 98 of masculine, 54 of feminine, and only 39 of androgynous orientation--combined with the fact that there was no statistically significant difference for gender roles by sex--are therefore intriguing at the very least.

These extremely important findings add a refreshingly hopeful aspect to the painfully heated feminist debates on gender polarization, even those well supported by careful and sharp analysis of our culture at large. The pernicious pervasiveness of gender polarization outlined by the leading expert in research on sex and gender, Bem (1993), "operates in two related ways. First, it defines mutually exclusive scripts for being male and female. Second, it defines any person or behavior that deviates from these scripts as problematic--as unnatural or immoral from a religious perspective or as biologically anomalous or psychologically pathological from a scientific perspective" (pp. 80-81). Bem's solution to this social dilemma, aside from her suggestions on legal and institutional restructuring, can be summarized to the point of oversimplification in one word: androgyny. However, since the gist of her argument for androgyny lies in eradication of gender polarization, it can be achieved in other ways, as is illustrated by the outcome

of this study. No gender differences on the basis of sex means the absence of gender polarization. The artificial gender gap has been bridged by the subjects in this study. Ostensibly, the sample in the current investigation is markedly different from the population at large, mainly in its intellectually elite status and development. Nevertheless, one can expect the process of unification and collaboration of the sexes to grow stronger and wider simply because it is connecting and liberating for both sexes, allowing for more choices in self-expression. Having more choices allows for greater flexibility, and according to Bateson (1978) the most flexible element in a system is the winning one. Campbell's (1988) inquiry into the nature of traditional cultural development in different societies led him to this conclusion:

> There's an old romantic idea in German, das Volk dichtet, which says that the ideas and poetry of the traditional cultures come out of the folk. They do not. They come out of an elite experience, the experience of people particularly gifted, whose ears are open to the song of the universe. These people speak to the folk, and there is an answer from the folk, which is then received as an interaction. But the first impulse in the shaping of a folk tradition comes from above, not from below. (Campbell, 1988, p. 85)

Following Campbell's logic, generalizations from this study, though confined to a certain population at the present time, are expected to make their way from an enlightened sector of the society to its broader structure.

In terms of the theoretical underpinnings of this

study, support was found for both Crosby's (1976) relative deprivation theory and Adams's (1965) and Walster, Walster, and Berscheid's (1978) equity theory, according to which perceptions of justice are the result of a comparison process in which the outcomes of one individual (the comparer) are compared to those of a comparative referent. In their evaluation of the fairness they experienced in the university, both male and female subjects compared their salaries and treatment in general to that received by their departmental colleagues, professors in other departments, professors in other universities, or to all three comparative referents.

The disagreement of the two theories over the nature of comparative referents has been reconciled in this investigation by showing that both types of comparative referents were used by the subjects, both separately and as complementing each other. According to relative deprivation theory, this comparative referent may be another group or person, what one received in the past, expects to receive in the future, or even what one wants (Crosby, 1976). According to equity theory (Adams, 1965), justice is achieved when the ratio of the comparer's inputs (contributions) to outcomes (rewards) is equal to the input/outcome ratio of a comparison other (Major, 1987). The subjects in this experiment, as evidenced by their written speculations on the extent of fair treatment they

received at the university, relied on groups, persons, what they received in the past, and what they expected to receive in the future as their comparative referent; they also compared their inputs and rewards to the inputs and rewards of comparison others.

In addition to these findings, support for Crosby's (1982) study was revealed in the qualitative part of this research. Crosby's (1982) investigation centered around attitudinal differences between high-prestige and low-prestige employed women and between employed men and housewives. Job-related deservedness or entitlement was among the variables in that study. Crosby concluded that, despite objective sex discrimination, job attitudes did not depend on sex. She referred to this as the "paradox of the contented female worker"; however, she also found that high-prestige individuals--women and men--resented the discriminatory treatment of women workers more than either low-prestige women or men did (pp. 12-13).

The reflection of the "paradox of the contented female worker" in this study is illustrated by the fact that, on average, women did not report being treated unfairly more than men did; however, a comparison of the complaints of the two groups tells a different story. Twelve reports of serious sexual discrimination or sexist treatment surfaced in the comments of female professors. No complaints of comparable seriousness were evident in the comments of male

professors. A condensed version of the male complaints is as follows:

Five "salary compression" complaints.
Two "politics"-related complaints.
One professor was "shortchanged in funds."
Another was "punished for outspokenness on controversial issues."
Another reported "bias against my work by my chairman."
Yet another stated that "some minorities are making more money than their productivity warrants."

A condensed version of the female complaints includes:

"Our department chair treats women more poorly than men."
"Exclusion from decision making."
"The old boys syndrome."
"An attempt was made to blackmail me."
"I have been postponed because I'm a woman and a minority; abused by supervisor in the past."
"Resented by my colleagues, mostly men."
"Department chairman said he didn't see how a woman could be successful at a career and parenting."
"Administration pegged us [women] as incompetent."
"The glass ceiling is getting lower, especially for women."
"I complained of sexual harassment and there was retaliation by 10 male members of our department."
"Traditionally male professions receive higher salaries than traditionally female professions (even within the university)."
"I was shocked to find my salary was so low that it stood out in our department."
"I have been treated unfairly because there is such a small number of female faculty in our college."

There are also complaints of this sort from the women:

Three complaints that "Minority untenured faculty are hired at higher salaries than experienced, tenured ones."
Three complaints of "salary compression."
One complaint of an unfair female supervisor.
There are a number of opinions on the role of politics at the university.

This very condensed version of the nature of the complaints by male and female professors and the obvious

difference in the frequency and magnitude of mistreatment reported by the two sexes, despite the lack of any difference in their final evaluation of the fairness of their treatment, indicates the continued presence of the "paradox of the contented female worker" in the university. The university professors' comments are presented in full in Appendix D.

In spite of this latter finding a summary of the outcome of this study is refreshingly optimistic, as it appears that the university professors in the sample succeeded in defying what is often referred to as the androcentric, gender polarizing, and sexually discriminatory world of today by creating an egalitarian island in the midst of that world. They have exhibited no gender differences by sex, thereby transcending gender polarization in that sense. They have shown no sex differences in their sense of entitlement or in their justice-related preference for equality in reward allocation, defying androcentrism. Thus, the university professors balanced the equity theory's conventional ratio for the sexes, by ascribing equal values to sex as an "input," which in turn required equal rewards or "outputs" on the basis of sex. A plethora of suggestions for improvement are nevertheless to be found in the professors comments. Where and how to direct constructive efforts toward improvement may define the nature of the next investigation.

Recommendations

The outcomes of this study point out the following areas to be addressed in future research on sex and gender attributes.

1. More subpopulation studies are of interest to the inquiry into the nature of the shared human potential to preserve individual differences in spite of strongly imposed cultural mores or misleading popular beliefs.

2. Using a number of observational procedures and designs to study the effects of socioeconomic status on sex attributes would provide for solid rather than fragmented knowledge of the phenomena in question.

3. Careful matching of subjects on their socioeconomic background and cross studies of subjects of contrasting socioeconomic status are necessary in any research into sex attributes. The failure to account for the disadvantaged status of certain groups in a class-oriented society leads to the perpetuation of behavioral attributes as group-specific rather than status-specific. Clearly, more sex- and gender-related research is needed before any gender role is put forward as the paradigm of mental health or a model to strive for.

Remaining questions

Any solid research conclusions should withstand replications. Therefore, these questions are of interest: How would the results of this study change if all of its limitations were addressed in future research? How would they change if the scope of the study were expanded to the national level?

Implications for counseling

More attention to the investigation of the undifferentiated gender role orientation is warranted. Interestingly, the most avid proponents of androgyny--psychotherapists--themselves, in general, manifest an undifferentiated gender role orientation (Berzins et al., 1981). If humanists (psychotherapists) and the intellectual elite (university professors) show adherence to an undifferentiated gender role orientation, it may tell us something of importance that has been overlooked in the trend of inquiry into traditional vs. androgynous gender roles.

Embracing androgyny as a growth-affirming goal for clients (Baker, 1980; Bem, 1993) and responding to calls for counselors to adopt the orientation for themselves (Warell, 1980; Cook, 1985) may be irrelevant to clients' agendas and reflective of counselors' beliefs being insensitively imposed on clients' values. This type of counseling

scenario may be termed "an oppression-sensitive therapy turning oppressive" and should be avoided at all costs.

A confirmation of the need for oppression-sensitive therapy is yet another implication of this study, as it demonstrates the powerful effects of one's standing on the ladder of socioeconomic prestige. Just how much a cultural taboo the discussion of the American social class system presents is wittily outlined by Fussell (1992):

> Although most Americans sense that they live within an extremely complicated system of social classes and suspect that much of what is thought and done here is prompted by considerations of status, the subject has remained murky. And always touchy. You can outrage people today simply by mentioning social class, very much the way, sipping tea among the aspidistras a century ago, you could silence a party by adverting too openly to sex. When, recently, asked what I am writing, I have answered, "A book about social class in America," people tend first to straighten their ties and sneak a glance at their cuffs to see how far fraying has advanced there. Then, a few minutes later, they silently get up and walk away. It is not just that I am feared as a class spy. It is as if I had said, "I am working on a book urging the beating to death of baby whales using the dead bodies of baby seals." (Fussell, 1992, p. 1)

Regrettably, Fussell's parody finds empirical support in this study. The impact of the social pyramid, though felt at its heaviest by the lowest structure, is evident even within the community of the intellectual elite, where divisiveness is created by the hierarchical allocation of funds to different colleges and departments, and as the lower end of the established hierarchy faces financial deprivation both in salaries and in opportunities for

academic advancement, supported by research grants, etc.

Financial and educational impoverishment poses even greater perils to those who find themselves at the bottom of the socioeconomic structure of society at large. The lower one's socioeconomic standing in the world is, the lower that person's access to supportive counseling is, but the need for it is greater and more urgent. How we can best address this need remains as a challenging question for further research and practice in counseling.

APPENDIX A

October 3, 1994

TO: Ms. Irina Anastasia
1215 NRN

FROM: C. Michael Levy, Chair,
University of Florida Institutional
Review Board

SUBJECT: Approval of Project #94.406
The effects of socio-economic influences & gender role on job-related personal entitlement & reward allocation patterns: A study of ...

I am pleased to advise you that the University of Florida Institutional Review Board has recommended the approval of this project. The Board concluded that your subjects will not be placed at risk in this research. Given your protocol, you should use the cover letter you submitted to us rather than attempting to obtain legally effective (signed and witnessed) informed consent from each participant. This approval, however, is conditional upon your submitting to the IRB a copy of the approved cover letter that includes the following phrase in the upper or lower margin: "Approved for use through October 3, 1995."

If you wish to make any changes in this protocol, you must disclose your plans before you implement them so that the Board can assess their impact on your project. In addition, you must report to the Board any unexpected complications arising from the project which affect your subjects.

If you have not completed this project by October 3, 1995, please telephone our office (392-0433) and we will tell you how to obtain a renewal.

By a copy of this memorandum, your Chair is reminded of the importance of being fully informed about the status of all projects involving human subjects in your department, and for reviewing these projects as often as necessary to insure that each project is being conducted in the manner approved by this memorandum.

CML/H2

cc: Vice President for Research
College Dean
J. Wittmer
Dr. Peter Sherrard

Unfunded

APPENDIX B

August 1, 1994

Dear University of Florida Professor:

You are kindly invited to participate in an anonymous study that I have designed in partial fulfillment of my Ph.D. requirements in the University of Florida's Mental Health Counseling Program.

The purpose of the study is to test aspects of equity theory; input from individuals having your degree of social status is essential to the validity of my study. Thus, I would be very grateful for your participation, which should take only a few minutes.

The results of this anonymous study will be held in strict confidence and will be used for my research purposes only. Enclosed is a stamped, return-addressed envelope for returning your completed questionnaire. Please contact me at 392-0731, extension 200, if you have any questions regarding the study.

I would like to wish you success in your current and future work projects; at this time, if you choose to participate in my study, please turn the page and complete the following 5-minute questionnaire.

Thank you for your interest and time,

Irina Anastasia
Doctoral Candidate

APPENDIX C

Without providing your name, please answer the following questions.

You do not have to answer any questions you do not wish to answer.

Demographic information:

1. Your age: _____

2. Your sex: M ___
   F ___

3. Your professional rank: Assistant Professor ___
   Associate Professor ___
   Full Professor ___

4. Years of postdoctoral professional experience: 0-5 ___
   6-10 ___
   over 10 ___

The following questions are designed to measure aspects of interpersonal disposition. Please circle the number indicating whether you agree strongly, agree somewhat, are unsure, disagree somewhat, or disagree strongly with each of the following statements.

	Agree Strongly	Agree Somewhat	Unsure	Disagree Somewhat	Disagree Strongly
5. There are too many people getting something	1	2	3	4	5

for nothing in this society.					
6. Many poor people simply don't want to work.	1	2	3	4	5
7. In America everyone should be treated equally because we are all human beings.	1	2	3	4	5
8. Anyone receiving welfare in this country should be made to work for the money they get.	1	2	3	4	5
9. Those who are well off in this country should help those who are less fortunate.	1	2	3	4	5
10. Basic services such as health care and legal assistance should be provided to everyone by the government, free of charge.	1	2	3	4	5
11. Maybe it's not their fault, but most poor people were brought up without ambition.	1	2	3	4	5
12. If the government must go deeper in debt to help people, it should do so.	1	2	3	4	5
13. The most important human value is compassion for others.	1	2	3	4	5

14. Most poor people don't have the ability to get ahead.	1	2	3	4	5
15. It is not right for people to go hungry in our country.	1	2	3	4	5
16.All things considered, most people get just what they deserve out of life.	1	2	3	4	5

For the following statements, if you agree that the statement describes you, circle T (for TRUE); if the statement does not describe you, circle F (for FALSE).

T F 17. I like to be with people who assume a protective attitude toward me.

T F 18. I try to control others rather than permit them to control me.

T F 19. Surf-board riding would be too dangerous to me.

T F 20. If I have a problem, I like to work it out alone.

T F 21. I seldom go out of my way to do something just to make others happy.

T F 22. Adventures where I am on my own are a little frightening to me.

T F 23. I feel confident when directing the activities of others.

T F 24. I will keep working on a problem after others have given up.

T F 25. I would not like to be married to a protective person.

T F 26. I usually try to share my problems with someone who can help me.

T F 27. I don't care if my clothes are unstylish, as long as I like them.

T F 28. When I see a new invention, I attempt to find out how it works.

T F 29. People like to tell me their troubles because they know I will do everything I can to help them.

T F 30. Sometimes I let people push me around so they can feel important.

T F 31. I am only very rarely in a position where I feel a need to actively argue for a point of view I hold.

T F 32. I dislike people who are always asking me for advice.

T F 33. I seek out positions of authority.

T F 34. I believe in giving friends lots of help and advice.

T F 35. If someone finds fault with me, I either listen quietly or just ignore the whole thing.

T F 36. I get little satisfaction from serving others.

T F 37. I make certain I speak softly when I am in a public place.

T F 38. I am usually the first to offer a helping hand when it is needed.

T F 39. When I see someone I know from a distance, I don't go out of my way to say "Hello."

T F 40. I would prefer to care for a sick child myself rather than hire someone to nurse him or her.

T F 41. I prefer not being dependent on anyone for assistance.

T F 42. When I am with someone else I do most of the decision-making.

T F 43. I try to get at least some sleep every night.

T F 44. I don't mind being conspicuous.

T F 45. I would never pass up something that sounded like fun just because it was a little hazardous.

T F 46. I get a kick of seeing someone I dislike appear foolish in front of others.

T F 47. When someone opposes me on an issue, I usually find myself taking an even stronger stand than I did at first.

T F 48. When two persons are arguing, I often settle the argument for them.

T F 49. I will not go out of my way to behave in an approved way.

T F 50. I am quite independent of the people I know.

T F 51. I make all my clothes and shoes.

T F 52. If I were in politics, I would probably be seen as one of the forceful leaders of my party.

T F 53. I prefer a quiet, secure life to an adventurous one.

T F 54. I prefer to face my problems by myself.

T F 55. I try to get others to notice the way I dress.

T F 56. When I see someone who looks confused, I usually ask if I can be of any assistance.

T F 57. It is unrealistic for me to expect to do my best all the time.

T F 58. The good opinion of one's friends is one of the chief rewards for living a good life.

T F 59. If I get tired while playing a game, I generally stop playing.

T F 60. I could easily count from one to twenty-five.

T F 61. When I see a baby, I often ask to hold him or her.

T F 62. I am quite good at keeping others in line.

T F 63. I feel uncomfortable when people are paying attention to me.

T F 64. I am quite soft-spoken.

T F 65. I like to be with people who are less dependent

than I.

T F 66. I would resist anyone who tried to bully me.

T F 67. I don't want to be away from my family too much.

T F 68. I can run a mile in less than four minutes.

T F 69. Once in a while I enjoy acting as if I were tipsy.

T F 70. I feel incapable of handling many situations.

T F 71. I delight in feeling unattached.

T F 72. I would make a poor judge because I dislike telling others what to do.

T F 73. Seeing a helpless person makes me feel that I would like to take care of him or her.

T F 74. I usually make decisions without consulting others.

T F 75. It doesn't affect me one way or another to see a child being spanked.

T F 76. My goal is to do at least a little bit more than anyone else has done before.

T F 77. I usually wear something warm when I go outside on a cold day.

T F 78. To love and be loved is of greatest importance to me.

T F 79. I avoid some sports and hobbies because of their dangerous nature.

T F 80. One of the things which spurs me on to do my best is the realization that I will be praised for my work.

T F 81. People's tears tend to irritate me more than to arouse my sympathy.

The following questions concern your judgment of the fairness of your salary.

82. Please circle the number (from 1 to 9) of the answer best representing your judgment as to your present salary:

1 Extremely underpaid

2 Much underpaid

3 Somewhat underpaid

4 Slightly underpaid

5 Fairly paid

6 Slightly overpaid

7 Somewhat overpaid

8 Much overpaid

9 Extremely overpaid

83. When you think about how you, as compared to your colleagues, have been rewarded by the University, how do you feel?

84. Have you been treated fairly? If not, why not?

APPENDIX D

Subjects' responses to questions 83 and 84 of the questionnaire.

83. When you think about how you, as compared to your colleagues, have been rewarded by the University, how do you feel? (Please use back of page to respond.)

84. Have you been treated fairly? If not, why not? (Please use back of page to respond.)

Males

Assistant Professors, 0-5 Years Experience

Age 30
83. Many of my colleagues have been even less fairly rewarded for their work and accomplishments at the University, because the institutional structure of UF has consistently undervalued the importance of major research in non-science fields.
84. I have been treated extremely fairly by the individuals I deal with here--although, again, the institution as a whole has been less kind.

Age 37
83. It depends on the colleague. Some are overpaid while many are underpaid. However, my emotions towards others' compensation are not very strong.
84. Yes, I have been given freedom to pursue areas of interest that I uncover. Still, there is sufficient motivation to achieve short-term results.

Age 42
83. Fine.
84. Yes.
Your questions attempt to address complex issues as black and white. It therefore fails to adequately provide my true feelings on all the issues. Therefore similar topics were answered with opposing views.
Good luck! Please publish results!

Age 48
83. Slightly disappointed.
84. I have been here 2 years and have been recommended for tenure and promotion by my Chairman for next year so I am pleased with my work situation. The underpayment situation is a general problem for academics.

Assistant Professors, 6-10 Years Experience

Age 33
83. Compared w/ others in my Dept. and College, my salary is higher than average considering my rank. Compared w/ salaries at other institutions, my salary is about average. However, compared w/ salaries in the private sector and other fields w/ similar training and education, I am underpaid.
84. Yes.

Assistant Professors, Over 10 Years Experience

Age 35
83. I would feel happy to be rewarded, but would recognize my accomplishments are no greater than most of my colleagues.
84. Yes.

Age 38
83. Politics pays off and I do not "politic" enough, so do not get the plum awards. My own fault/choice.
84. Fairly.

Age 41
83. Overall satisfied. Lucky that I'm compensated the amount I am receiving although I work very hard for it.
84. Overall fairly, particularly at UF.

Associate Professors, 0-5 Years Experience

Age 39
83. The University doesn't know what it wants from faculty as long as the answer to the state, legislature etc. is pol. correct. Research should be the highest priority of an academic institution. It is only through this endeavor that knowledge can be passed to students. In short Lombardi and Sorenson are jerks who have everyone conned. UF will always be a second rate educational academic institution.
84. Not fairly. There is a definite bias against my work by the chairman who controls the department.

Associate Professors, 6-10 Years Experience

Age 34
83. I feel that I'm not alone. Most of my colleagues have not been rewarded adequately for the work they do.
84. I feel that the reward system is pretty arbitrary and unfair. However, I don't feel that I've been treated any worse than the majority of my colleagues.

Age 39
83. I have been treated no better or worse than any colleagues. We have all been treated rather poorly.
84. Yes.

Age 42
83. I feel that I have not been rewarded for my productivity in all program areas (teaching, research, extension) relative to individuals who produce less but spend much more time in self-promotion or else politicking those in positions of authority. I also feel that I have been punished for outspokenness on controversial issues.
84. I'd say my fairness quotient has increased in the last year due to a sympathetic administrator, but by-and-large, I'd have to declare that I've been treated less fairly than some other colleagues, more fairly than others.

Age 42
83. I feel the university (i.e., administrators) does not place a high value on my contributions to research and teaching. The "rewards" given by IFAS/UF administrators virtually always are given to high profile research programs which enhance the image of those administrators. There are a number of faculty who make substantive contributions to science who are ignored because they do not possess the "sales" talents of other, prominent faculty. My consolation is that this lack of recognition and reward appears endemic among our administrative system . . . with the possible exception of Pres. Lombardi. With only few exceptions, the politicized nature of our administrative system appears to encourage administrators to engage in "cover your butt" decision making. This unfortunately filters down to faculty and USPS thereby lowering morale and creating a system where the "letter of the law" is more important than the "spirit of the law."
84. I have been treated as fairly as our system allows. This would be a much better place to work if all employees (administrators, faculty, staff) placed value and showed interest in the contributions of others. In addition, the topic of salary is seldom mentioned. Like it or not, salary is of some importance. My peers in industry are currently making 50 to 100% more than me. My peers at other

universities are making 15 to 25% more. Assistant professors at UF/IFAS are starting at salaries only slightly lower than mine.

Due to salary compression combined with uncompassionate and weak leadership throughout UF/IFAS bureaucracy, I have recently begun considering other opportunities and am working to advance my career elsewhere within the next 5 years.

Associate Professors, Over 10 Years Experience

Age 40
83. and 84. I'm being treated as I expected to be treated and I think it is fair, compared to colleagues.

Age 42
83. and 84. Rewards come in many forms. In my experience at the University, the most significant relationship with a potential source of reward has been to my department chairman, whom I hold in the highest regard. Because I feel I have been treated fairly by him, including allocation of what monetary rewards have been available, I am satisfied in this relationship.

With respect to the University as a whole, I have some reservations about the effectiveness of my Dean, and the extent of his vision for our college. For President Lombardi, I have great respect in his job of juggling the mission of the University with state politics. He is a breath of fresh air after his predecessor, even though I do not always agree with his point of view.

Age 44
83. I feel that the University neglected for too long the problem of salary compression and lost some good people because of it. My salary was for years severely compressed and only recently has improved enough to put me ahead of new assistant professors. I got a TIP award which pulled me up to a good level, so it wasn't really much of an improvement based on salary compression, as much as a reward for my effort.
84. No. Lack of commitment from the University for those of us who stuck with this place has been discouraging.

Age 45
83. Being an individual who has not always traveled the routine path, my colleagues don't even understand who I am, what I do and why I do it. As such, they rarely realize what I have accomplished; but they always remember when I don't know an answer. My philosophy has been, "it is not the knowledge, but the quest." I have had to find my own rewards. Those from others are rare.

84. Due to the same things as mentioned above, the answer is no. Yet, while this may seem bitter, it is not. There are more important things than being treated fair or equal. Sometimes it is just to be left alone.

Age 47
83. and 84. I have been treated quite fairly in most things I can think of at UF. Generally, I believe the admin. and college admin. are doing all they can for faculty--e.g., pay. But that is up to the Legislature (and thus the people).

Age 47
83. I feel that those with an MD degree have been rewarded more in salary and fringe ben. than those in the same Dept. with Ph.D.s.
I think the Univ. has not rewarded its faculty in gen. when compared to the $ for cap. improvements.
84. ?

Age 51
83. and 84. Shortchanged--based on the support (technical help, travel funds, etc.) given to my colleagues in my unit.

Age 51
83. and 84. Like many, victim of "salary compression."

Age 55
83. Mostly OK with exception of issue in No. 84. My Dept. and College have been fair . . . the University itself has not.
84. No. University committee failed to vote for my promotion even though I had near unanimous support from my Dept. and College--believe that reasons for vote were based on factors other than my performance.

Age 61
83. I have never checked how much my colleagues are making.
84.

Full Professors, 0-5 Years Experience

Age 59
83. and 84. The University system has decided to reward research to the greatest extent while undervaluing teaching and service. The consequence is poor student counseling, rush from teaching to research and the gradual shift (now more rapid) to the self-centered faculty. Because the reward system is skewed toward research those faculty with appointments including a greater proportion of teaching and service are less well paid. Accordingly, administrators

argue they treat faculty fairly, but I would argue they expect many faculty to devote work time to these lesser valued activities and so should have a mechanism to reward good efforts in the same manner. From the above it is logical to conclude my duties include a larger amount of teaching and service and the [sic] for performing these tasks well has been less well compensated. I consider this unfair and counter productive. The University community should not be composed of a minority of very well compensated superstars, who by and large are not a great deal better or productive than their contemporaries. Rather it seems to be a self-serving means for administrators to claim they have "developed" well-qualified and well-respected experts in their respective areas.

Full Professors, Over 10 Years Experience

Age 43
83. and 84. The pay scale in my department is inverted. Many unproductive people are the highest paid.

Age 43
83. The major problem is that the longer you stay at UF, the more likely your salary will not keep pace with colleagues across the country. Since being promoted to Full Professor in 1988, my relative position among colleagues across the U.S. in my disciplinary area (in terms of salary) has continuously eroded. I ranked higher on salary among Full Professors in 1988 than I do today, despite greater experience, more publications, etc. Florida simply has not effectively addressed the salary compression issue. As a consequence, highly talented senior faculty leave in order to secure the financial compensation they so well deserve from some other institution.
84. Yes.

Age 48
83. I have been treated as well as or a bit better than my colleagues, with respect to salary.
84. Depends on context. Fairly by my immediate supervisor, but unfairly by legislature.

Age 50
83. Having been promoted to Associate Professor early, I spent 2 extra years as an associate prof. due to a new departmental chairman. He did not support my promotion to full professor as he felt I did not generate enough funding. Fortunately my college and the university felt I was worthy of promotion. I am grateful for this. Because I have been here for 16 years, salary compression became a problem. I was happy and shocked to learn I received a large salary

increase this year. Thus while I sometimes feel frustrated by the functioning of this university, I am very fortunate to be where I am.
84. Yes.

Age 51
83. and 84. Probably just about anybody feels that they have not been treated entirely fairly. Matching rewards with a person's own measures of worth rarely favorably support "the system." Answering your question is complicated by ego, other personality traits, a person's age and self-awareness and inner peace. "The system's" fairness isn't all there is in life. Personally, I earn a good salary (but think it should be higher because of my colleagues' salaries), and have modest resources available. Sometimes matching expectations with resources leads easily to undue concern about fairness.

Age 52
83. I have been treated fairly relative to my colleagues for the most part. There are a few exceptions. The University is falling behind the market for everyone.
84. See 83.

Age 53
83. I believe the Univ. has treated all of us the same. The admin. is not very caring or sympathetic.
84. We, the Profs., are treated the same by Univ. admin. Not very well. There is no mechanism for "feed-back." Promotion and Tenure needs guidelines and consistency.
Hard workers should be rewarded. TIP is a joke--rewards productivity not quality!

Age 55
83. and 84. Too many accomplishments and too few rewards of recognition.

Age 57
83. I could trust the UF management 20 years ago. But not now. The interest in teaching is a sham. The T.I.P. is a lie.
84. I have not--but I don't care.
I hope this helps you in your degree--hang in there.

Age 57
83. Before we had the equal opportunity push, it was O.K. We now have some minorities making more than their productivity warrants.
84. One more note: Administrators who drop back into faculty lines are even more overpaid than the minorities, relative to other faculty performance levels.

Age 59
83. and 84. I resent the policy of not giving every faculty a cost of living raise. It seems immoral to take away from one to give another a raise.
I believe a professor should be above the "market place" value on his career. We should not seek reward unless it is awarded on merit by colleagues over a long period of time.

Age 60
83. Ugly.
84. Salary compression; have not succumbed to "gamesmanship" re: salary increments--to which the University does respond; my discipline doesn't have much market-place value. No.

Age 62
83. I am a victim of salary compression since I joined the faculty here in 1967. At the time I was the highest paid Associate Prof. in the department. Over the years, my raises have been higher than average. But new professors are being hired at $40,000 to 50,000 more than I make. However, my salary is higher than most of my colleagues who joined the faculty about the same time I did.
84. I don't think that salary compression is fair, but it is a phenomenon at most universities. I don't blame the universities for being unfair. Compression is occurring in industry also. I received a salary compression adjustment of $2,000 last year. It is just a drop in the bucket relative to the extent of the compression, but indicated to me that UF is at least aware of the situation and trying to do something about it.

Age 66
83. and 84. The University has ignored my standing in the international community of scholars. (I am a member of a foreign academy of sciences.) The administration may criticize my not following their party line.

Age 66
83. Not rewarded for increasing knowledge of subject, improvement of teaching, and enhancement of relationships with students over time.
84. No.
Teaching: Departmental evaluation based solely on evaluations of students, mostly first semester students in large classes.
Research: Based only on the number of papers published; three per year never enough.
Service: Largely ignored.

Age 67
83. No real feeling.
84. I have been treated fairly.

Females

Assistant Professors, 0-5 Years Experience

Age 26
83. Fine.
84. Yes. My only complaint is that the University has not been helpful in finding a job for my significant other.

Age 29
83. and 84. At present, I feel I've been treated pretty fairly. I just got here a couple of months ago, and my colleagues have all been quite helpful and kind. One area where I feel as if I was not treated completely "equitably" is in teaching assignments. Another assist. prof. hired at the same time as I has a lighter teaching load for a full year, compared to mine. This decision, I think, was inequitable.

Age 32
83. Both I and my colleagues work very long hours to accomplish our work.
As a reward, the University requires us to work longer hours.
84. No, no one in administration will listen to us. Any attempt to make them understand might result in being fired.

Age 34
84. I believe I have been treated fairly, in general. However,
83. I feel that most faculty at UF are not rewarded sufficiently for the amount of work they do. This means that (some) faculty who have been here many years see little point in working extra hard. The work still has to be done, so that means even more work for the rest of us.
I also feel that sometimes people are rewarded simply for having been here a long time, rather than for continuing excellent work. This hasn't affected me directly but has had an impact on other faculty members I know.
Good luck with your study.

Age 36
83. My feelings fluctuate on this point. Sometimes I feel rewarded and other times I do not feel that I am rewarded for the hard work I do. My department chair tends to favor

one of our faculty members.
84. Pretty fair--except, I think our department chair treats women more poorly than men, especially the young, untenured women.

Age 39
83. and 84. Overall I feel I have been treated fairly. It is difficult to make direct comparisons in many ways though.

Age 39
83. Slighted. The appointment assigned to me is 90% teaching and 10% research. I do not enjoy the level of support (technical) in tangible or intangible (prestige) ways when compared to colleagues with greater research appointments. Much of my work is viewed as "service."
84. No one is interested in "fairness." If you don't protect yourself or delineate your responsibilities no one else will do this for you. This university is comprised of individuals largely interested in their own projects--few are interested in the welfare of others. If UF were a business it would have gone-out-of-business long ago!

Age 43
83. I don't usually think about it--I care more about recognition from my peers.
I haven't thought about this much. I'm more concerned about recognition of my work--grants awarded, # of times papers are cited. My salary is adequate but I think it probably is a bit lower than my peers. (I did receive a raise that was termed compression/inversion.)
84. Yes--although it has taken me some time to realize that I have to complain politely but loudly to obtain some of the resources I need to carry out my research (mainly space).

Age 44
83. I feel that my low salary stems from the ineptness/inertia of my direct supervisor--on the whole my colleagues are also grossly underpaid for their education and experience so in that sense I have not been singled out--the University does not seem to have a very valid evaluation system. [Therefore] the rewards are not administered in a very judicious manner (it seems to be rather arbitrary).
84. In the sense that all the people in my particular college have been treated unfairly then I guess I would have to say I have been treated unfairly.
(1) Low pay (could make twice as much in outside world).
(2) Lack of support facilities and staff.
(3) Exclusion from decision making process.
(4) Lack of support for faculty conducted research.
Note: Our college is primarily women which in part may

account for our current position in the pecking order.

Age 44
83. Most rewards seem to go to those persons who publish--regardless of the quality of their work or their contribution to the other missions of the University. I pride myself on my teaching and service--two grossly unrewarded aspects of university life.
84. My evaluations are consistently excellent, yet my salary is grossly below what it should be for someone with 15 years of excellent work at the University. Relatively "new" faculty (new to UF, new to university teaching, with new doctorates) (with comparable years of work elsewhere or with less years of total work experience) are hired at salaries like mine. They are an "unknown" quantity--I am a proven quantity. Salary compression is partly to blame for this--but when resources are scarce administrators need to reward the few who excel, not just spread the merit money around.

Age 49
83. The University proper has been fair to me when compared with other University faculty. My salary and benefits are approximately 50% of my colleagues who are not university employees. Since I am expected to be excellent in my profession, in research, and in teaching, the salary inequity is a disgrace. How can we be on the cutting edge when unable to attract and/or maintain the top people in the field?
84. Within my college, I have not been treated fairly. My Dean has rewarded her favorite people with [higher] salary, special bonuses, extra time off, [lower] teaching load. Those who are not in favor often work harder, take [higher] teaching loads, and work longer to hold status quo. Some highly productive, well-known faculty are openly ridiculed without good reason.

Personally I have longevity, tenure, excellent teaching and course evaluations, but new faculty are <u>all</u> hired-in at a salary above mine. Some new faculty are new graduates without any professional or teaching experience. This is not fair.

<u>Assistant Professors, 6-10 Years Experience</u>

Age 33
83. The standards in my dept. are low. I was unable to negotiate satisfactory compensation initially, but I have remedied this problem in the last 9 months. I feel I am being rewarded fairly now.
84. Initially, no, because I was not in a position to negotiate my salary.

Age 35
83. I do not feel that I have been rewarded at all. I am very frustrated with the lack of recognition from the administration and lack of monetary rewards.
84. No. I have not been treated fairly for several reasons. The "Old Boy" Network still is very strong in my department. I am not the type of person who goes around telling everyone how wonderful I am. The squeaky wheel seems to get more oil around here. Right now I am the most unhappy about my situation.

Age 40
83. A bad time--I just worked hard for a TIP award and didn't get it.
84. Came here thinking I would get a raise, but didn't.

Assistant Professors, Over 10 Years Experience

Age 44
83. Inequities across departments (and probably within) on salaries.
The squeaky wheel gets the grease ($--) those who ask/demand get more.

Associate Professors, 6-10 Years Experience

Age 34
83. Often times I feel as if true hard work is not adequately rewarded. I see many colleagues who carry a substantially smaller load (25% or less) being rewarded at a higher level than those who carry a full load plus. I also feel that there is a discrimination against certain areas of expertise within the department/college and a corresponding favoritism towards other areas.
84. In general, yes I have been treated fairly, although there have been a few slight incidents where I feel somewhat mistreated. These have definitely been minor and few in number.

Age 38
83. Pleased with TIP awards.
In recruitment of minorities I have experienced a new Ph.D. untenured assistant professor being hired in at a higher salary than myself and several other experienced, tenured, Associate Professors. Our chairman helped us get a raise but it was barely over the newly hired person's salary. This could be depressing.
84. Yes.
The questions on this survey are often strange and

subjective--I found it difficult to answer. It gave me the feeling of someone attempting to label me or make my personality fit into a box.

Age 39
83. and 84. I feel I am treated fairly on a monetary scale but certainly not on a human scale! Because I am a woman, I end up receiving duties that others (i.e. men) could do or should be doing. However, the supervisor knows I will do them right and on time, but I am never rewarded for these extra duties. In fact, I am penalized because they ultimately take me away from my assigned duties (i.e., 70% research).

When I came up for tenure and promotion, I felt I was lied to and blackmailed or the attempt was made to blackmail me. Fortunately, I am married to a professor who thought things were abnormal and forced me to start asking questions. I did receive tenure and promotion, but my self-esteem was destroyed. I spent over a year recovering. My answers to your questions would have been quite different two years ago!!

Good luck!

Age 39
83. I feel the administration has been careful to treat me fairly, that is to pay me as much as my colleagues, but that they are unwilling to see me (or reward me) as being exceptional, despite the fact that I publish and practice (consult) as well as teach. This is unusual in my department. I feel that opportunities are never volunteered (i.e. going to conferences, teaching seminars), but only accrue to me when I am adamant. Again, those who do less on their own seem to receive stimulus from the department and college administration.
84.

Age 40
83. The University rarely rewards anyone but their top 1%. Just doing a good job should get some recognition.
84. Fairly, yes.

Age 44
83. and 84. When compared to most of my colleagues, I feel I have been treated similarly relative to some rewards (promotion, equipment needs, technical support, departmental faculty development funds). However salary rewards compared to some is the main point of contention. I also feel that my teaching efforts (professional students and residents) have not been recognized by either salary or commendations. In part that is due to limited resources and prizes, but often the same folks are selected for recognition in the college because of publicity they receive, often self-

promoted. I am in general, quiet, preferring to do a very good job rather than promote my accomplishments, hoping they will speak for themselves. For this reason, I feel that sometimes I am overlooked. This may be more my problem than the University's.

In summary: I feel there are many excellent faculty members who go unrecognized for their efforts. To me that is unfair.

Age 48
83. I believe I've been well rewarded for my work within the limits of the University. I have been given raises that were larger than colleagues to bring me up to scale, but not so large to be out of line with University guidelines. I could make more money at another institution, mainly because I could negotiate a higher starting salary, but I've found a level of recognition and respect here that may be worth more than a higher salary.
84. Very fairly--mostly due to an enlightened chairman who helps us set and meet goals, encourages good work and recognizes success.

Age 54
83. I have been postponed b/c I am a woman and a minority.
84. Abused by supervisor in past. Salary not increased as retaliation.

Associate Professors, Over 10 Years Experience

Age 36
83. I do a good job and I have been fairly rewarded for it.
84. Yes.

Age 39
83. I feel like there are no rewards for quiet excellence--no real merit system based on evaluation of our productivity.
84. I think the treatment is "fair" in the sense that there is not a systematic bias against me by virtue of gender, age, etc., but the system of rewards for everyone is not related to productivity or to any standards of excellence.

Age 42
83. I feel lucky compared to many of my colleagues.
84. No one is treated completely fairly--the world is not fair. But any situation is what you make of it and I make the best I can of mine.

Age 42
83. and 84. Think I am underpaid. I am not alone. Many faculty are underpaid. The bulk of salary dollars in my

college goes to the professors though there is no data to indicate that they bring in the bulk of dollars.
Pay should be for superiority not just seniority.

Age 43
83. I feel that I've been fairly rewarded since joining the faculty at UF. I've received merit pay, discretionary $, college teacher of the year, TIP award, and special raises from both the Dean and Provost, even when no raises were granted in a 2-year period recently.
84. No. As a female who has been fairly rewarded and who is outspoken, a leader in the department and college, strong, and successful, I have been resented by my colleagues, most of whom are male. They are very threatened by women who are neither benign nor mediocre. There is still a large amount of cronyism at UF.

Age 43
83. and 84. I have been treated unfairly, because there are such a small number of female faculty in our College. The male consciousness at this time is below that of females'. Women perceive the universe differently and as a result their objectives do not correspond to that of already established white male system. Since women value system is different they are not rewarded for what they like and consequently are best at. So, women are forced to perform in the same way as men do and that results in job dissatisfaction and eventually failure; or as I have chosen, to do what they think is important and in this case they are not rewarded.

Age 44
83. Most often I have been rewarded equally. Some administrators are better than others. My salary is the lowest within my rank--don't quite know why!
84. Most often treated fairly. Except by a few bad administrators--they don't know how to manage people!

Age 47
83. and 84. No. I do not feel that I have been treated fairly by the University with regard to salary. I'm not sure who my colleagues are in terms of this question. Are the doctors in the Med school my colleagues because they too are tenured faculty? I tend to think so. Since we live in a culture that for whatever reasons worships (or at least has) physicians, and pays them outlandish salaries, the Docs in the Med school are richly rewarded for their labors--which are important. But, so are mine. I prepare teachers, and I contribute to the improvement of education in this country. But, teachers, children, and education are all held in low esteem right now--so, my salary reflects that low value society places on the work I do. However, the

University ought to know better--here, of all places, the importance of excellence in education at all levels should be recognized and rewarded. However, like or not, although we in the academy like to say that we are somehow superior to the common culture--those of us in education are grossly underpaid in academe as we are in the society at large.

If my colleagues in this question refers to those who are in my own Department--I still feel unfairly treated. When I was hired, I was told directly that I could not expect to earn maximum increases for my first few years here because those nearing retirement (nearly all men) would get the allocated monies so they could retire at a high salary. Now that I am in full stride as an assoc. prof., the people being hired new to my College are coming in at salaries that exceed mine. There is no justice in the system.

My work is not rewarded in other ways as well--in fact, this University undermines the College of Education time and time again. The senior administrators through their actions and words have let us know in this College that they do not value our contributions--in fact they feel we really don't make any of significance. It's difficult when the family you are a member of (the University) doesn't value you as a family member. I use the analogy of a family rather than a business. Were our College a division within a business, I would be valued more because my work brings in a profit--we're a cheap College to run and we turn out a product that's in demand--teachers. However, like a family, what is valued within a University has more to do with the culture and the mores operating within the institution than it has to do with the "bottom line." Had I understood all this years ago, however, I would still have entered education because I believe education offers the best hope of achieving an equitable society wherein all people have an opportunity to achieve their potential.

Sorry for the typos it's the best I could do in the time available. Good luck on your dissertation.

Age 49
83. and 84. OK--but not great. Teachers are very undervalued in this society. Also, I know there are others on campus who neither care about, nor work as hard at teaching as I do who make a lot more than I do.

Within the scope of my unit I'm doing OK. Within greater society, I don't feel I'm getting the salary I deserve.

Age 49
83. I do not think I have been mentored or given adequate support as an academician. Often I have felt warned or threatened (i.e. "I'm telling you what you need to do in order not to fail") rather than encouraged; I have gotten little praise/reward for the accomplishments I have made

(e.g. large grants and contracts); I believe I am paid less well than colleagues on same level of competence and productivity (= less than national ave. for my rank and position).
84. I don't believe my treatment has been fair and equitable. Some, I think is an (unconscious) bias--I am a lone Ph.D. among MDs in a clinical faculty department. For example, when there were no state raises, my MD colleagues got increases from clinical dollars. When it later could have been made up for me, it wasn't; when a coworker-collaborator (MD) and I had the same publications one year, I got a lower % increase (of course on a base already only 1/2 of the MD). Also two different chairmen of my Dept. have spoken to me about how few women with children are on our faculty; one said he didn't see how a woman could be successful at a career and parenting! And these male colleagues are expected to deserve more and need more $--so may do better at getting raises.

On the other hand compared to others in the world who work hard at many stressful, unpleasant, yet important jobs I feel grateful for my level of salary. Being somewhere in the middle, I wish everyone could at least be at my level (if the very wealthy's income were re-distributed it would probably be possible).

Age 51
83. and 84. #82 answers it. [82. 1: Extremely underpaid]

Age 54
83. and 84. Unfairly--always have the heaviest teaching load in my area--4 to 5 classes per semester. No credit for all the service I have done for the public schools. No support for research. I'm in the process of looking for another position. I am considering leaving teaching rather than stay here--[ ].

Age 55
83. and 84. My salary is among the lowest--probably is the lowest--of the Associate Profs. in the College of Nursing. The Dean's solution is for me to apply for promotion to Full Professor. I would just like to be paid adequately as an Assoc. Prof.

Full Professors, 0-5 Years Experience

Age 36
83. Within my department, fairly well compensated; within University as a whole overcompensated.
84.

Full Professors, Over 10 Years Experience

Age [not identified/given]
83. and 84. I am now fairly paid and fairly treated as a faculty member. But I was underpaid and treated unfairly as an administrator and previously as a faculty member. I have had to work "twice as hard to be paid even half as much," to get recognition for my work and my successes. The University does little to nothing to encourage its female faculty. The administration pegged us as relatively incompetent compared to males and the current administration, although talking a good game, is even more sexist than those of the past. They make a point of wanting to recruit women faculty, but they are not interested in improving the environment for women who have taken or who will take faculty positions at the University. Senior males/females who are national scholars are rarely consulted and are not taken seriously by the UF administration.

Age 43
83. I have generally been rewarded well by the University. So have my colleagues at the faculty level (many more than deserved). At the USPS, post doc., grad. student, and other staff levels . . . little reward seems apparent for those who do excellent work or "above and beyond."
84. Yup.

Age 43
83. and 84. This is a complex question. Salary is influenced by compression and by the value society places on one's work. So traditionally male professions receive higher salaries than traditionally female professions (even within the university). This creates some great disparities. Those who do the work aren't necessarily those who get paid well or rewarded by the institution.

In addition universities operate on an external market system. Those who receive competitive offers get salary boosts. So those who are place-bound and too ethical to interview for positions they'd never accept are not rewarded. Loyalty and excellence combined should be rewarded but aren't.

So no--I don't think I've been treated fairly but it's the institution that is to blame not the individuals around me who make the lower level decisions.

Age 46
83. "Persistence pays off."
84. Yes and no.
Overall, I am satisfied w/ my job.
I do perform some admin. tasks which are not remunerated financially.

So in that way--I am not being treated "fairly" or equally w my colleagues.

Age 46
83.
84. I have been treated "fairly" within the institution, but those in educational institutions have not been rewarded by society at large commensurate with their contributions.

Age 47
83. I am being passed over for the leadership of my division even though I am doing the work of the Chief, have the experience and expertise and they are searching for someone! I was told they want "an outside person" even though lots of other "inside people"--besides me, and mostly men not women, were promoted to Division Chief position. The glass ceiling is getting lower and lower at UF--especially for women.
84. No. For most of my career at UF, I was grossly underpaid compared to other faculty. Once we had a new department chairperson, things improved.

Age 47
83. and 84. I do not think my college or university has cut any slack for me, but, in general, when I have asserted a legitimate interest of mine, it has been respected and acknowledged. I've had to do what anyone else has had to do to be rewarded, which includes writing papers, teaching well, performing service, surviving politics. I think people get treated unfairly when they do not assert their interests or when they do so in a way that does not dovetail with the interests of the person being petitioned. It is heavily political. After the basic hurdles of excellent teaching, research and service, rewards in my experience, arrive when it is in the best interest of the rewarder to provide them--i.e. I'll leave and I am undervalued and it would be a loss if I went.

Age 49
83. I feel angry that many males are able to obtain large salary increases by getting job offers from elsewhere and getting UF to make a matching offer. Females are less moveable because of spouses or partners and societal expectations, and so cannot get these offers as easily.
84. No--see above.

Age 49
83. and 84. My lab is at the Whitney Lab of the University of Florida, a Marine Research Institute of the University. Compared to my male colleagues at the Whitney Lab, I am fairly paid. Compared to our colleagues on the Main Campus, all of us at the Whitney Lab are underpaid. I suppose there

are other compensations, that have little to do with money.

Age 51
83. I think my salary is below my male "match" in the dept. because I complained of Sexual Harassment one year, and there was retaliation by 10 male members of my dept. the next year when I went up for promotion to full prof. and I lost a $5,000 salary raise for 2-3 years fighting those negative votes. I don't blame the college or Univ. admin. (Provost) but the male members of my own department. However, money isn't everything and I had to make a stand, and so I did. I did it for my daughter and people your age who should benefit in 5 to 10 years by what [female] profs. do now.
84. Yes by the University in general; no by my own colleagues in dept. (See above answer.) But neither was Margaret Mead treated fairly. She was not a member of Columbia's Anthro. dept. til she retired, almost. She had to fight to become Pres. of Amer'n Anthro. Ass'n; her male colleagues didn't want her to have that honor. Women profs. are still fighting for status and pay. If we don't, you won't get status or pay ten years down the road either. My daughter's 25 and I want her to succeed more'n I have. I hope you do too. Good luck with your study. Persevere!

Age 52
83. and 84. I have been treated fairly in all ways except salary. As part of a dual career couple who is not seen as "mobile," my pay has remained low despite my rank and publication record. Frankly, I am trying to leave UF because I am so disgusted with my salary.

Age 56
83. and 84. I don't think much about salary but I was shocked to find my salary was so low it stood out in my dept. and med. school and I got a salary infusion to bring me up a couple of percentile points from lowest 12th to ?
I have enough for my wants so it doesn't make me feel particularly bad--there's a tremendous amount of inequality in the world and I have been very very lucky.

Age 59
83. Salaries are too low for level of ed. required. No merit pay negates incentives to be "the best."
84. Dean and Assoc. Dean have nixed most of my choices of projects for students and learning experiences for myself.

Age 60
83. and 84. Over the first half of my employment I consistently received raises that exceeded the "across-the-board" allocated raise percentage. I was always delighted to have my efforts recognized tangibly.

In the later years my salary has jumped up considerably, aided by or near the standard raise increase, which I feel has rewarded me for all my contributions over a long period of time. I do not know where I fit salary wise as compared to my colleagues (most of whom are male) and that does not matter to me. I recently received an academic honor far beyond any possible expectations which has distinguished me from many of my colleagues, and, of course, I feel that I have been treated very generously by the University.

Age 62
83. No not really--example--when I won a National Teaching Award--it was not mentioned in the dept.--nor was there any publicity--The same award was given to a faculty member at Univ. of Pennsylvania--She had a reception in Philadelphia--"Roses" and a full page spread in the Inquirer!--One does not "work" here for rewards--not in our department.
84. (In spite of my belief that my salary is fair)--Due to salary compression and need to accommodate new faculty--have not received salary in line with incoming faculty--although I understand this--do feel the policy does not reward hard working experienced faculty. Perhaps I feel too much is done for new faculty (such as top of line employment etc--).

Age 63
83. In comparison with others I feel I have been fairly rewarded by the University.
84. I feel I have been treated fairly here. Although some of the programs for which I'm responsible have been less well supported than I would have liked, I realize that the art of the possible prevails. On the whole I am very pleased with the opportunities I have enjoyed here.

Age 67
83. and 84. I have been rewarded (re: grants, awards) quite well because I work harder than most of my colleagues and have winner ideas. Salaries in the South are ridiculously low. I lost much salary coming down from the South because of rejoining my husband on this campus. I've always resented it--although I have a higher salary than he does.

APPENDIX E

Table 21

Frequencies of IDI by Sex Observations

IDI	Sex		
	Male	Female	Total
Masculine	53	45	98
Feminine	24	30	54
Androgynous	15	24	39
Undifferentiated	53	66	119
Total	145	165	310

Four surveys had missing values for this table.

Table 22

Frequencies of Years of Experience by Sex Observations

Years of Experience	Sex		
	Male	Female	Total
0-5 years	34	45	79
6-10 years	22	32	54
Over 10 years	90	91	181
Total	146	168	314

Table 23

Frequencies of IDI by Rank Observations

IDI	Rank			
	Assistant	Associate	Full	Total
Masculine	33	32	33	98
Feminine	19	17	18	54
Androgynous	13	13	13	39
Undifferentiated	34	38	47	119
Total	99	100	111	310

Four surveys had missing values for this table.

Table 24

Frequencies of IDI by Years of Experience Observations

IDI	Years of Experience			
	0-5	6-10	Over 10	Total
Masculine	26	9	63	98
Feminine	12	12	30	54
Androgynous	10	8	21	39
Undifferentiated	28	24	67	119
Total	76	53	181	310

Four surveys had missing values for this table.

Table 25

Frequencies of Rank by Years of Experience Observations

Rank	Years of Experience			
	0-5	6-10	Over 10	Total
Assistant	62	23	17	102
Associate	11	30	60	101
Full	6	1	104	111
Total	79	54	181	314

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Irina Anastasia was born in Krasnoyarsk, Siberian region of the former USSR, in 1960 as Irina Timofievna Kondratieva. She lived in Yalta (Ukraine) from age two until age 24, graduating from Yalta high school in 1977. She obtained a degree in nursing from Yalta Medical School and studied philology at Frunze University until departing for the United States in 1984.

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I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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